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REVISITING MEDICAL ERROR:
FIVE YEARS AFTER THE IOM REPORT,
HAVE REPORTING SYSTEMS MADE A
MEASURABLE DIFFERENCE?
Maxine M Harringtont
I. INTRODUCTION
It is said that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. So, too, might
be said of medical error, an elusive concept brought to national
prominence in 1999 by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) with its land-
mark report, To Err is Human, Building a Safer Health System.1 Re-
lying primarily on two studies conducted in 1984 and 1992, the IOM
concluded that between 44,000 and 98,000 patients die every year in
hospitals as the result of medical error.2 Using the lower estimate, the
IOM asserted that more people die annually from medical error than
from automobile accidents, breast cancer or AIDS.3
Even though much of the material was not new, the IOM report
galvanized public and political attention on the problem of medical
error.4 A torrent of publicity following the release of the report fo-
t Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law;
J.D., The George Washington University. I am grateful to Susan Ayres, Cynthia
Fountaine and Earl Martin for their helpful comments. I also appreciate the invalu-
able research assistance of my students, Natalie Voss and Kathryn Friddle.
I COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To
ERR IS HUMAN (Linda Kohn et al. eds., 2000), available at http://books.nap.edu/
books/0309068371/html/index.html [hereinafter IOM REPORT]. The Institute of Medi-
cine is a private, non-profit component of the National Academy of Sciences and
serves to advise governmental and private bodies on issues pertaining to health and
science. See INST. OF MED. NAT'L ACADS., About, at http://www.iom.edu/about.asp
(last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
2 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 26.31id.
4 Health professionals have long recognized that medical care can cause
harm to patients and several studies, dating back to the 1960s, demonstrated high
rates of adverse events, many of which were preventable. See e.g., Lucian A. Leape,
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cused primarily on the shocking number of deaths due to medical er-
rors. The New York Times compared the IOM's estimate of deaths "to
having three jumbo jets filled with patients crash every two days.",
5
One poll showed that fifty-one percent of the public closely followed
news of the IOM's report about the high number of medical errors in
hospitals.
6
The IOM set a clear goal to reduce error: "[g]iven current knowl-
edge about the magnitude of the problem, the committee believes it
would be irresponsible to expect anything less than a 50 percent re-
duction in errors over five years." 7 To accomplish this objective, the
IOM suggested a four-part strategy.8 The most important from a legal
perspective was a recommendation that error-reporting systems be
established. 9 Reporting is a central element of patient safety because
it can identify medical errors, allow providers to learn from their mis-
takes, and monitor progress in the prevention of error.' ° The IOM
called for a nationwide, mandatory system administered by the states
for reporting errors that cause serious harm or death, and voluntary,
non-regulatory reporting programs for those errors that cause minor or
no harm to patients."' The recommendation for mandatory reporting
systems has been controversial because the IOM felt strongly that
reports of serious errors should be made available to the public and
that health care providers should be held "accountable" for such er-
rors.12 On the other hand, it saw a need for protection of data col-
Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1851 (1994).
5 Editorial, Preventing Fatal Medical Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at
A22 (quoting Dr. Lucian Leape's assessment of the IOM Report).
6 What the Public Understands About Health Stories in the News, THE
KAISER/HARV. HEALTH NEWS INDEX (Nov./Dec. 1999), available at
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/133501l.pdf. Despite widespread public atten-
tion on the number of deaths, it is interesting that just three years after the IOM re-
port, a survey of physicians and the public found that a majority of both groups be-
lieved that fewer than 5,000 deaths occurred in hospitals each year due to error.
Robert J. Blendon, et al., Views of Practicing Physicians and the Public on Medical
Error, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1933, 1935 (2002).
7 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
8 Id. at 6 (recommending establishing leadership at the national level to
enhance patient safety; identifying and learning from errors through reporting sys-
tems; raising standards and expectations in safety through oversight groups; and cre-
ating safety systems in health care organizations).
9 Id. at 9.
10 Id. at 8. See also Lucian L. Leape, Reporting of Adverse Events, 347 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1633, 1633 (2002).
ll IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-10.
12 Id. at 8.
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lected by voluntary reporting systems and urged Congress to enact
legislation to provide peer review protection for these reports. 1
3
Since the IOM report, the patient safety movement has burgeoned.
There has been a flurry of activity in Congress and in state legislatures
focusing primarily on the IOM's alarming numbers and its recom-
mendation for medical error reporting systems. In February 2000,
President Clinton, echoing the IOM's objective, announced a national
action plan to reduce preventable medical errors by fifty percent
within five years. 4 But has this goal been realized? The public was
recently confronted with a report that not only refuted the notion that
safety in hospitals has improved in the last five years, but also as-
serted that the IOM had vastly underestimated the scope of the prob-
lem. 15 Citing 195,000 deaths due to medical error each year, the press
release announcing the report stated: "[t]he equivalent of 390 jumbo
jets full of people are dying each year due to likely preventable, in-
hospital medical errors, making this one of the leading killers in the
u.s.
, , 6
The true incidence of medical error may be more uncertain than
either the IOM or other studies suggest. Acceptance of the IOM's
estimates of error-related deaths has broad implications for federal
and state policy, which has largely been driven by the IOM report.
States have responded to the alarming numbers by implementing
mandatory error reporting systems or revising existing systems.
Health care professionals and organizations have balked at state man-
dates because of fear of increased malpractice litigation or discipli-
nary actions due to disclosure of errors. Beginning in 2000 and each
following year, both Houses of Congress introduced, but did not pass,
legislation that would protect reported errors from disclosure in legal
proceedings.
7
Although the goal of patient safety is a laudable one, it is ques-
tionable whether state and national policy can be made on so vague a
concept as "medical error." There is neither an accurate baseline nor
13 id. at 10.
14 President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President on Medical Errors
at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Executive Office Building (Feb. 22, 2000), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/wh22200rem.htm.
15 HEALTHGRADES QUALITY STUDY: PATIENT SAFETY IN AMERICAN
HOSPITALS 1, 8 (July 2004), available at http://www.healthgrades.com/media/english/
HGPatient SafetyStudyFund.pdf [hereinafter HEALTHGRADES STUDY].
16 Press Release, In-Hospital Deaths from Medical Errors at 195,000 Per
Year, HealthGrades Study Finds (July 27, 2004), available at
http://www.healthgrades.com/PressRoom/index.cfm?ifuseaction=PressReleases (quot-
ing Dr. Samantha Collier).
17 See discussion infra Part Il. C.
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reliable current data that could be used to validate the effectiveness of
reporting systems as tools for improving patient safety. This Article
examines the difficulty in estimating the incidence of medical error,
including the lack of uniform standards of measurement and the legal
and cultural disincentives to accurate reporting of error. Part I pro-
vides a brief background of the IOM report and addresses the reliabil-
ity of error statistics derived from clinical studies, including those
relied on by the IOM. Clinical empirical data are pertinent to the legal
discussion of medical error because they provide a baseline from
which to measure a reduction in error and because the IOM used these
figures in support of its proposal for comprehensive medical error
reporting laws as part of the cure for an ailing health system. Part II
examines the inherent problems with using current reporting systems
to identify and to measure any reduction in the rate of medical error.
Most systems are not effective in capturing medical errors because
they lack standardized definitions of reportable events. In particular,
there is a patchwork of legislation at the state level that substantially
limits the usefulness of the data collected. Efforts to obtain reliable
information on medical error have also been hindered by the problem
of underreporting, primarily due to fear of malpractice litigation and
employer retaliation. Part III explores a framework for state and fed-
eral legislation to improve reporting systems and to enhance the abil-
ity to gather useful and valid information on medical errors. Part IV
presents a brief conclusion.
II. CLINICAL ESTIMATES OF MEDICAL ERROR:
THE CORRECT DIAGNOSIS?
The IOM's estimate of 44,000-98,000 error-related hospital
deaths has been controversial. The problem with using these statistics
as a baseline is deciding if either number or some figure in between is
a reliable estimate of annual hospital deaths due to medical error. The
upper and lower estimates vary by over 100%, which is an unaccept-
able range for a scientific study. Using these numbers, one could
plausibly argue that between 1984 and 1992, when the studies on
which the IOM relied were conducted, the death rate due to medical
error fell by over fifty percent. 18 The IOM implicitly rejected this
view, however, by concluding that temporal changes in health care
and differences in patient populations and systems could explain the
18 Richard E. Anderson, Comment, How Many Deaths are Due to Medical
Error?, 284 JAMA 2188, 2188-89 (2000) (criticizing the IOM Report).
[Vol. 15:329
REVISITING MEDICAL ERROR
difference. 19 What the IOM did not explain is how a fifty percent
reduction in health care can be measured without a reliable baseline.
A. The IOM Report - The Underlying Studies
The numbers of deaths due to medical error advanced by the IOM
were derived from two studies of hospital discharges, the Harvard
Medical Practice Study (HMPS), conducted in New York, and a simi-
lar study analyzing data in Utah and Colorado hospitals, the Utah-
Colorado Medical Practice Study (UCMPS).2 ° The HMPS, published
in 1991, was based on a retrospective review of 30,121 medical re-
cords of patients discharged from acute care hospitals in New York in
1984.21 The UCMPS looked at hospital discharges in 1992.22
In the HMPS, nurses and medical analysts screened the records
for evidence of a possible adverse event. An adverse event was de-
fined as "an injury that was caused by medical management (rather
than the underlying disease) and that prolonged the hospitalization,
produced a disability at the time of discharge, or both. 23 If records
met screening criteria for an adverse event, they were referred to two
physicians for separate evaluation. The investigators concluded that
adverse events occurred in 3.7% of hospitalizations.24 Although most
of these adverse events gave rise to disability lasting less than six
months, 13.6% resulted in death, and 2.6% caused permanent, dis-
abling injuries.25  A later published article concluded that approxi-
mately one-half of the deaths caused by adverse events in the study
were preventable.26
Using the same methods as the HMPS, the UCMPS looked at
15,000 medical records of hospital patients discharged in 1992 from
19 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
20 ld. at 26.
21 Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in
Hospitalized Patients - Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study 1, 324 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991).
22 Eric J. Thomas et al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negli-
gent Care in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261 (2000).
23 Brennan et al., supra note 21, at 370. The IOM defined an adverse event as
"an injury caused by medical management rather than by the underlying condition of
the patient." 1OM REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
24 Brennan et al., supra note 21, at 371.
25 Id. at 373.
26 Lucian L. Leape et al., Preventing Medical Injury, 19 QUALITY REV. BULL.
144, 147 (1993). The authors found that seventy-eight percent of the fatal adverse
events were preventable, but not that seventy-eight percent of the deaths were pre-
ventable. Many patients were severely ill and would have died even if the adverse
event had not occurred. Id. This is a distinction not always noted by other studies in
determining the incidence of deaths due to preventable medical error.
2005]
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twenty-eight Utah and Colorado hospitals.27 The investigators found
an adverse event rate of 2.9% in each state.28 Over one-half of the
adverse events were deemed preventable. 29 Death occurred in 6.9%
of preventable adverse events.3°
Extrapolating the data from these two studies to over 33.6 million
hospital admissions in the United States in 1997, the IOM calculated
that the UCMPS study implied an annual rate of approximately
44,000 deaths due to medical errors, while the HMPS suggested ap-
proximately 98,000 deaths.3' Interestingly, neither the HMPS nor the
UCMPS was a study of medical error. The purpose of the studies was
to obtain reliable statistics on the incidence of adverse events and neg-
ligence in hospitalized patients and their relationship to malpractice
claims.32
Proper terminology is important in the discussion of medical er-
ror. An adverse event is not equivalent to medical error.33 An adverse
event is a complication of treatment and many such events are not
preventable. Medical care entails risk and bad outcomes occur in
medicine, not all of which are attributable to error or negligence. Ad-
verse drug events provide the best example of this problem. The IOM
defined an adverse drug event as "an injury resulting from medical
intervention related to a drug. 34 An adverse drug event may arise
from an unanticipated reaction to the drug, a medication error com-
mitted by a health care professionals or improper use by the patient.
For instance, a patient who receives a medication for the first time,
such as an antibiotic, may experience an allergic reaction. This would
be an adverse drug event because it is caused by the drug, and not by
the patient's underlying condition. Because no one could anticipate
the patient was allergic to the antibiotic, it is not a preventable adverse
event. However, if the patient receives a second dose after a demon-
strated allergy, the second dose causing an allergic reaction is a pre-
ventable adverse event and, in the opinion of the IOM, an error.35 The
27 Thomas et al., supra note 22, at 261.
28 Id. at 265.
29 Eric J. Thomas, et al., Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah and Colorado, 36
INQUIRY 255, 259 (1999).
30 Id. The authors did not distinguish between the preventability of the ad-
verse events and the preventability of the deaths. See Leape et al., supra note 26, at
147.
31 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 31.
32 See Brennan et al., supra note 21, at 370.
33 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 28 (defining "preventable adverse event" as
an adverse event caused by error).
34 Id. at 33.
31 See id.
[Vol. 15:329
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failure of the patient to take the drug as directed could also constitute
an error.
36
The IOM's estimate of error-related deaths proved controversial.
Troyen Brennan, one of the authors of both the HMPS and the
UCMPS, has warned that a fifty percent decrease in the rate of error
will be difficult to accomplish because there is no baseline informa-
tion on errors in the general medical population, and because "the
reliability of identifying errors is methodologically suspect. 3 7 Ac-
cording to Brennan, a preventable adverse event and an error are not
the same, and the classification of events in the HMPS may not repre-
sent the views of other physicians and should not be generalized be-
yond the investigators' individual judgments.38 Other critics contend
that the numbers cited by the IOM are exaggerated and that the IOM
failed to explain its reasoning and used unaccepted scientific methods
in calculating the estimates.39
Coming to the IOM's defense, Lucian Leape, a well-known safety
expert and participant in both the HMPS and IOM report, responded
that the estimate of up to 98,000 deaths a year was conservative.4 °
36 The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and
Prevention (NCC MERP) defines a medication error as "any preventable event that
may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or patient harm while the medica-
tion is in the control of the health care professional, patient, or consumer. Such events
may be related to professional practice, health care products, procedures, and systems,
including prescribing, order communication, product labeling, packaging, nomencla-
ture, compounding, dispensing, distribution, administration, monitoring and use."
NAT'L COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR MEDICATION ERROR REPORTING & PREVENTION,
Consumer Information for Safe Medication Use, at http://www.nccmerp.org/
consumerlnfo.html. This definition includes errors that are not attributable to a health
care professional such as patient misuse.
37 Troyen A. Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors -
Could It Do Harm?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1123,1124 (2000).
38 Id. at 1123.
39 See Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer, Estimating Hospital Deaths
Due to Medical Errors: Preventability is in the Eye of the Reviewer, 286 JAMA 415,
419 (2001) (stating that actual deaths due to medical error are much lower than the
IOM's estimates); Harold C. Sox, Jr. & Steven Woloshin, How Many Deaths Are Due
to Medical Error? Getting the Number Right, 3 EFFECTIVE CLINICAL PRACT. 277, 278
(2000) (criticizing the IOM's failure to explain its calculations); Clement J. McDon-
ald et al., Deaths Due to Medical Errors Are Exaggerated in Institute of Medicine
Report, 284 JAMA 93, 94 (2000) (contending the IOM failed to use a control group
that would provide evidence of the death rate in a similar population that did not
experience adverse events).
40 Lucian L. Leape, Institute of Medicine Medical Error Figures Are Not
Exaggerated, 284 JAMA 95, 97 (2000) (stating that record-review studies actually
produce a conservative result). See also Saul N. Weingart et al., Epidemiology of
Medical Error, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 774, 774 (2000) (concluding the HMPS and
UCMPS probably represent the lower boundary of medical error); Lori B. Andrews et
al., An Alternative Strategy for Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349
2005]
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Noting that the HMPS and UCMPS included only hospital patients,
Leape contended that with more than half of surgeries performed in
ambulatory surgery centers and millions of patients in nursing homes,
the report, if anything, underestimated the total number of medical
errors.41 Leape further suggested that many errors are not documented
in the medical record and are not captured by chart review.42 Finally,
several respected, large-scale studies in other countries using methods
similar to the HMPS have reported even greater rates of preventable
adverse events in hospitalized patients.
43
The debate following the IOM report illustrates the difficulty in
measuring medical error. This article neither endorses nor rejects the
IOM statistics on the rate of medical error, but rather, challenges the
assumption that we can achieve a finite reduction in error and ques-
tions whether patient safety policies can rest on numbers that are un-
certain and elusive. Questioning the precision of the estimates, how-
ever, does not detract from the fact the IOM brought much-needed
public attention to patient safety. Medical errors are a serious prob-
lem and occur far too often in both inpatient and outpatient settings.
The shocking numbers of deaths reported by the IOM were likely
intended to "to break [the] cycle of inaction 4 4 where medical error
was not addressed by the media, health care providers or the public.
Although the estimates did indeed capture the public's and politi-
cians' attention, they also overshadowed the primary message of the
IOM that broad systemic changes are needed in the health care sys-
tem. In its most recent report on patient safety, the IOM appeared to
recognize the controversy over its estimate of error-related deaths and
retreated from providing hard numbers.45 Yet, the IOM's earlier fig-
ures linger, and five years later the figures are still used by state legis-
latures, Congress, and others in support of their political agendas.46
LANCET 309, 312 (1997) (suggesting that the HMPS statistics may underestimate the
extent of the problem).
41 Leape, supra note 40, at 97.42 Id.
43 G. Ross Baker et al., The Canadian Adverse Events Study: The Incidence
of Adverse Events Among Hospital Patients in Canada, 170 CAN. MED. ASS'N J.
1678, 1683 (2004) (7.5% adverse event rate; 36.9% were considered preventable);
Ross McL Wilson et al., The Quality in Australian Health Care Study, 163 MED. J.
AuST. 458, 465 (1995) (16.6% adverse event rate; 51% of those were considered
preventable).
44 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing the goal of the report).
45 COMM. ON DATA STANDARDS FOR PATIENT SAFETY, INST. OF MED., PATIENT
SAFETY: ACHIEVING A NEW STANDARD FOR CARE 3 (Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2004)
[hereinafter PATIENT SAFETY] ("It is not possible to quantify the full magnitude of the
safety challenge with certainty.").
46 See, e.g., Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, S. 544,
[Vol. 15:329
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Further, as discussed in Part II, the number of errors captured annually
by reporting systems do not approach even the lower estimate of
44,000 error-related deaths cited by the IOM. The IOM Report's fo-
cus on numbers raises questions about its accuracy and leads to an
examination of the methods used by the studies on which it relied.
B. The Problem of Hindsight Review
The two studies that serve as the basis for the IOM's numbers
have themselves been subject to criticism for their methodology. 47
The HMPS and the UCMPS used one to three physicians to review
medical records and to judge whether an adverse event occurred and
whether it caused the patient's death or disability. Both involved ret-
rospective analysis of medical records in which the outcomes were
already known. It has long been recognized that retrospective or
"hindsight" reviews are tainted by outcome bias.48 Hindsight or out-
come bias refers to the tendency of individuals with knowledge of the
outcome to assign higher probability estimates to an event than those
without such knowledge. 49 A review of the literature led several ex-
perts to remark that "hindsight bias is the greatest obstacle to evaluat-
ing the performance of humans in complex systems after bad out-
comes."
50
109th Cong. (2005). Findings in the pending legislation include: "[iun 1999, the
Institute of Medicine released a report entitled 'To Err is Human' that described
medical errors as the eighth leading cause of death in the United States, with as many
as 98,000 people dying as a result of medical errors each year." Id.; DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES & OFFICE FOR THE NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, THE DECADE OF HEALTH INFO. TECH.: DELIVERING
CONSUMER-CENTRIC AND INFORMATION-RICH HEALTH CARE, FRAMEWORK FOR
STRATEGIC ACTION 2 (2004), available at http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/documents/
hitframework.pdf (citing to the IOM's estimates of 44,000-98,000 annual deaths in
support of a new federal initiative on health information technology). See also infra
notes 95, 96 (using the estimates to oppose legislation affecting medical malpractice
actions).
47 See, e.g., McDonald et al., supra note 39, at 94.
48 See generally, Baruch Fischoff, Hindsight # Foresight: The Effect of Out-
come Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975) (demonstrating that outcome affected
the prediction of events, and that subjects were unaware of the effect outcome bias
had on their decision making); Richard I. Cook & David D. Woods, Operating at the
Sharp End: The Complexity of Human Error in HUMAN ERROR IN MEDICINE 255,293
(Marilyn Sue Bogner ed., 1994).
49 Hal R. Arkes et al., Hindsight Bias Among Physicians Weighing the Like-
lihood of Diagnoses, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 252, 252 (1981). See also Leape, supra
note 40, at 95 ("Hindsight bias would tend to overestimate the number of deaths due
to adverse events.").50 Cook & Woods, supra note 48, at 295.
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Applying these principles to physicians, Hal Arkes, a researcher
in medical decision making, demonstrated that despite the fact that
physicians were by training and knowledge well-equipped to assess
medical decisions, they were still susceptible to hindsight bias and
"tried to make sense out of what they knew had happened rather than
analyzing the available data independently."'', Arkes' conclusions
were later confirmed in a study dealing with the appropriateness of
anesthesia care.52  One hundred twelve anesthesiologists were pro-
vided twenty-one cases with the same descriptive facts, but with out-
comes randomly assigned as permanent or temporary. When asked to
judge the quality of care, the physicians tended to rate the care in
cases where the outcome was permanent as inappropriate, while they
viewed the same conduct as appropriate when the injury was only
temporary. 3 The authors concluded that knowledge of the severity of
the outcome significantly influenced a reviewer's judgment of the
54appropriateness of care.
Labeling an event as error often depends on after-the-fact knowl-
edge of the outcome.55 In the HMPS, errors of omission, including
failure to use appropriate tests, avoidable delays in treatment and
failed diagnoses, were a large percentage of the total.56 These types of
errors may be particularly susceptible to hindsight bias for in many
cases those errors involve an assessment of whether the physician, or
other health care provider, used appropriate clinical judgment, given
the outcome that occurred. Diagnostic errors, in particular, have been
recognized as less preventable than those related to other causes.57 An
error does not occur simply because a diagnosis turns out to be incor-
rect. The boundary between an acceptable practice and a mistake is
51 Arkes et al., supra note 49, at 254.
52 Robert A. Caplan et al., Effect of Outcome on Physician Judgments of
Appropriateness of Care, 265 JAMA 1957 (1991).
53 Id. at 1959 (finding that physicians' opinions as to acceptable treatment
decreased by thirty-one percent when the outcome was changed from temporary to
permanent and increased by twenty-nine percent when the outcome was changed
from permanent to temporary).
14 Id. at 1960.
55 Outcome is important in cases dealing with an adverse event. An adverse
event implies injury or a bad outcome from treatment. Many errors don't cause harm;
they are close calls. The HMPS and UCMPS included only adverse events that re-
sulted in 5 atient death or disability. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
Lucian A. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized
Patients - Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study fl, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED.
377, 381 (1991).
57 John Sanders & Aneez Esmail, The Frequency and Nature of Medical
Error in Primary Care: Understanding the Diversity Across Studies, 20 FAM. PRAc.
231, 233 (2003).
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not always clear-cut, and if the physician exercises appropriate clini-
cal judgment, a "wrong" diagnosis is neither preventable nor correct-
able.
The tendency to impute causation with knowledge of the outcome
is also a weakness in retrospective reviews.58 There can be multiple
causes of patient injury. In many complex cases the cause of an event
is not observable and requires the exercise of clinical judgment to
distinguish between complications from the underlying disease, com-
plications from treatment and complications from medical error.
59
The IOM itself seems to have succumbed to hindsight bias in its
recommendation for the voluntary reporting of errors that cause little
or no harm, but mandatory reporting of errors that cause serious dis-
ability or death.60 This is an outcome-dependent analysis. Some er-
rors may be egregious, but cause no harm. Other errors may be mi-
nor, but cause serious harm. For example, in the HMPS study, negli-
gent errors were ranked in order of seriousness, but the type of error,
not the outcome, determined the classification of seriousness. 61 The
authors recognized that "[a] momentary lapse that delays the diagno-
sis of a skin rash is usually of little consequence, for example,
whereas a similar lapse during a brain operation can have disastrous
effects." 62
Although the IOM recognized the limitations inherent in retro-
63
spective reviews, it seemed to minimize the problem by failing to
address hindsight bias in the studies on which it relied. Its only refer-
ence to hindsight bias reflects that the IOM thought this issue was
primarily a problem with reviewers simplifying the cause of an event,
i.e., blaming the accident on an individual rather than on system fail-
ure.
6 4
58 G. Neale & M. Woloshynowych, Retrospective Case Record Review: A
Blunt Instrument That Needs Sharpening, 12 QUALITY & SAFEFTY HEALTH CARE 2, 3
(2003).
59 See Timothy P. Hofer & Rodney A. Hayward, Are Bad Outcomes from
Questionable Clinical Decisions Preventable Medical Errors? A Case of Cascade
latrogenesis, 137 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 327, 328 (2002) (stating that many inci-
dents that are classified as preventable errors are not so obvious and may actually
have little impact on the patient's prognosis).
60 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
61 Leape et al., supra note 56, at 382, table 8.
62 Id. at 383.
63 See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 53.
64 Id. ("[H]indsight bias makes it easy to arrive at a simple solution or to
blame an individual, but difficult to determine what really went wrong.").
2005]
HEAL TH MA TRIX
C. Reviewer Reliability
In addition to the problem of hindsight bias, studies have also
confirmed that the reliability of ratings on retrospective chart reviews
among reviewers is not high.65 Investigators have demonstrated that
physicians have a difficult time agreeing on what kind of conduct
constitutes an adverse event and whether the event itself, or rather, the
patient's underlying condition caused an injury or death.
Five years after the original HMPS was published, a team of in-
vestigators reviewed records from the study in order to determine the
degree of agreement among physicians on the cause of adverse out-
comes. 66  In 12.9% of cases, paired physicians strongly disagreed
about the occurrence of an adverse event. 67 The cases of disagree-
ment outnumbered those in which the physicians agreed (ten percent),
with the lowest rate of consensus on adverse events caused by failure
to diagnose or lack of therapy. 68 The authors noted that chart review
might be particularly unreliable when physicians are asked to ascer-
tain which deaths are preventable. 69 Noting the "common tendency
' 70
of experts to disagree, this study casts doubt on the accuracy of the
data on which the IOM relied to extrapolate deaths due to medical
error.
A recent analysis of records from the UCMPS also challenges the
lower figure set by the IOM.7' The investigators randomly selected
65 See, e.g., Eric J. Thomas & Laura A. Petersen, Measuring Errors and
Adverse Events in Health Care, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 61, 63 (2003) (noting
judgments about adverse events by chart reviewers have low to moderate reliability);
A. Russell Localio et al., Identifying Adverse Events Caused by Medical Care: De-
gree of Physician Agreement in a Retrospective Chart Review, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 457, 461 (1996) (corroborating other studies that found implicit record review
produces disagreement among physicians on the quality of care); Ellen J. MacKenzie
et al., Inter-rater Reliability of Preventable Death Judgments, 33 J. TRAUMA 292, 300
(1992) (finding that inter-rater reliability of preventable death judgments was gener-
ally low.)66 Localio et al., supra note 65, at 457.
67 Id. at 460.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 462-63. See also Robert W. Dubois & Robert H. Brook, Preventable
Deaths: Who, How Often, and Why?, 109 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 582, 586-588
(1988) (during a chart review of hospital deaths, using a majority rules criterion,
twenty-seven percent of hospital deaths were judged definitely or probably prevent-
able. When unanimity was required, the percent of definite or probable deaths
dropped by almost half (fourteen percent)).
70 Localio et al., supra note 65, at 457. In the Australian study, there was a
fifty-one percent agreement among the reviewers on whether an adverse event was
preventable, i.e. a medical error. Wilson et al., supra note 43, at 465.
71 Eric J. Thomas et al., The Reliability of Medical Record Review for Esti-
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500 records from the original study that had been screened by nurses
and referred to a single physician reviewer.72 Records were submitted
to three independent reviewers. The investigators found "moderate to
poor inter-rater reliability" among reviewers trying to identify both
adverse events and negligent adverse events.73 The study concluded
that the figures for error-related death reported by the IOM are "im-
precise" and that the estimate of 44,000 deaths could be approxi-
mately fifty percent lower if the study had required agreement by two
reviewers rather than the single reviewer, but could be thirty percent
higher if the required reviewer confidence about the presence of an
adverse event was lower.74 The authors of the study cautioned re-
searchers in using the data from the UCMPS to estimate the incidence
75and prevalence of errors.
Adverse events caused by a wrong diagnosis, delay in diagnosis,
or inappropriate treatment may be particularly susceptible to dis-
agreement.76 In these cases, reviewers must not only determine if an
adverse event occurred, but also decide if an accurate diagnosis and
alternative therapy would have changed the outcome. The more seri-
ously ill the patient, the more difficult it is to assign a cause for a bad
outcome.77 The HMPS researchers warned that determining the cause
of death due to adverse events required "a note of caution." 78 Many
of the patients in the study were seriously ill and had very shortened
life expectancies. Even a terminally ill patient who had a few hours to
live was counted as a death resulting from medical injury if the ad-
verse event contributed in part to the patient's death.79
The ability of investigators to agree on whether adverse events are
preventable or involve negligence varies widely. 80 For instance, in the
mating Adverse Event Rates, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 812, 814 (2002) (showing
that the lower figure is possibly more sensitive to the reviewer consensus and confi-
dence).
72 Id. at 812. Some experts have noted that using a single physician reviewer
to ascertain quality of care deficiencies is unreliable, and have suggested multiple
reviewers to increase inter-reviewer reliability. See, e.g., Dubois & Brook, supra note
69, at 588 (suggesting that garnering reliable data may require unanimity among three
physicians).
73 Thomas et al., supra note 71, at 814.
74 id.
75 id.
76 Localio et al., supra note 65, at 462.
77 Id. See also Hayward & Hofer, supra note 39, at 419.
78 Brennan et al., supra note 21, at 375.
79 Id. The authors also cautioned against making comparisons based on cost
between the number of deaths due to hospital adverse events and deaths due to auto-
mobile accidents in which the victims are healthier and younger. Id.
80 See Hofer &. Hayward, supra note 59, at 328.
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HMPS, the authors conceded that the physician reviewers "disagreed
frequently about the extent of substandard care. ' 1 Other studies have
similarly shown that professionals cannot agree on what kind of con-
duct amounts to negligence, let alone medical error.8 2 This is not sur-
prising, as our medical malpractice system contemplates the use of
dueling experts to testify about acceptable medical standards of care
and whether a breach caused the patient's injury or death. In claims of
medical error, there are similar complex issues surrounding the quality
of care and the cause of events. Often no cause for the error can be
found. 3 Studies have shown that patients may experience "adverse
events" even with placebo or no treatment.8 4 In other cases, although
it is evident the health care provider made a mistake (or failed to
comply with the standard of care), the complexities of the case reveal
multiple or uncertain causes.
The available studies indicate there are substantial problems of
bias and unreliability in the retrospective review of medical records.
In many cases, the ability to distinguish error from a complication of
treatment or the negative outcome of disease is difficult and uncertain.
Whether 44,000 or 98,000 is the "right" number is also uncertain.
D. The Taxonomy of Medical Error
No one denies that errors occur in medicine, but "'[y]ou can't
measure what you can't define.' ' 86 One problem with ascertaining the
extent of medical error is the tendency by both laypersons and profes-
sionals to confuse or use interchangeable terms, such as adverse event,
81 Brennan et al., supra note 21, at 374.
82 See Bryan A. Liang, Assessing Medical Malpractice Jury Verdicts: A Case
Study of an Anesthesiology Department, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 140
(1997) (finding approximately one-half of the physicians involved had a different
understanding of appropriate care than the other half). See also Brennan et al., supra
note 21, at 374 (admitting that in the HMPS, judgments regarding negligence had a
low degree of reliability).
83 See Sanders & Esmail, supra note 57, at 233 (in up to fifty percent of
primary care cases, no cause for the error was identified).
84 See, e.g., U Reuter et al., Placebo Adverse Events In Headache Trials:
Headache as an Adverse Event of Placebo, 23 CEPHALALGIA 496, 498 (2003) (finding
ten to thirty percent of patients experienced headache after placebo and that many of
these headaches were mistakenly designated as drug related while the study was still
blinded); Frank P. Meyer et al., Adverse Nondrug Reactions: An Update, 60 CLImCAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 347, 348 (1996) (finding healthy volunteers not
administered any drugs often had symptoms similar to reactions associated with
drugs). 85 See Hofer & Hayward, supra note 59, at 330-31.
86 Saul N. Weingart & Lisa I. lezzoni, Looking for Medical Injuries Where
the Light is Bright, 290 JAMA 1917, 1917 (2003).
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medical error, and negligence. There is little consensus as to what
constitutes a medical error or even an adverse event.
8 7
Error is a loaded term. The IOM defined error as "the failure of a
planned action to be completed as intended (i.e., error of execution) or
the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e., error of planning). 88
As Brennan points out, this is not the generally accepted meaning of
error.89 Merriam-Webster's first definition of error is "an act or con-
dition of ignorant or imprudent deviation from a code of behavior." 90
Common synonyms include mistake, blunder, slip, and lapse.91 The
large number of error-related deaths, combined with the connotation
of the word error, led Brennan to conclude that the IOM report left a
negative impression that was not warranted by the underlying studies
or the progress made in patient safety in recent decades.92
Many people, including professionals, equate medical error with
negligence. 93 After the IOM report, a national magazine ran the head-
line, Doctors' Deadly Mistakes.94 Ignoring the lower figure of
44,000, patients and their attorneys often raise the issue of 98,000
dead due to medical error as evidence of "bad doctors" and call for
licensing boards to crack down on those who are responsible for such
errors. 95 Today, amidst the cries for tort reform, arguments again are
surfacing that use the IOM's statistics as evidence that malpractice
kills almost 98,000 patients every year and that the solution to the
medical malpractice crisis is not fewer suits, but more against the doc-
tors who commit mistakes. 96 Such claims are a misuse of the IOM
87 See, e.g., Sanders & Esmail, supra note 57, at 233.
88 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
89 Brennan, supra note 37, at 1123.
90 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 425 (11 th ed. 2003).
91 Id. Brennan noted a few other pejorative synonyms: blooper, boner, bun-
gle, goof, miscue, misstep and slip-up. Brennan, supra note 37, at 1123.
92 Brennan, supra note 37, at 1123-1124.
93 Investigators in the HMPS were careful to distinguish error from negli-
gence. See Leape et al., supra note 56, at 381 ("Negligence occurs not merely when
there is error, but when the degree of error exceeds an accepted norm."). Other pro-
fessionals may not understand the difference. See Leape supra note 4, at 1851 (stat-
ing a common belief by physicians is that an error is the result of negligence).
94 Michael D. Lemonick, Doctors' Deadly Mistakes, TIME, Dec. 13, 1999, at
74.
95 E.g., Leo V. Boyle, Keeping Patients and Our Wallets Safer (Jan. 28,
2002), available at http://www.atla.org/public/columns/wallets.aspx:
We can try to stop malpractice from occurring in the first place. According
to the Institute of Medicine's report To Err is Human, up to 98,000 patients
die in hospitals per year victims of preventable medical errors .... No one
wants good doctors to have their rates raised because of a few bad doctors'
medical malpractice.
96 E.g., Patient Access Crisis. The Role of Medical Litigation, Before the S.
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report as its key finding was that systems, not individual providers,
were at fault for the vast majority of medical errors.97 The IOM
stressed that the primary means to prevent error is not to increase in-
dividual accountability but to shed the shame and blame system that
places responsibility for error on individual health care providers.98
Recognizing that human error in any system is unavoidable and that
today's complex medical system provides the opportunity for errors to
occur, the 1OM called for nothing less than a redesign of the health
care system. 99 Yet, the 1OM could not have been naYve as to its
choice of the term error, with its pejorative connotation and its poten-
tial for misuse by those with a political or economic agenda. Despite
the IOM's focus on system failures, the term error suggests blame.
The IOM distinguished adverse events from errors by whether
they were preventable. But there often is no fine line to guide a phy-
sician in determining whether an undesirable result is preventable.
Some errors may increase the risk of a bad outcome, but leave open to
debate what caused the outcome. For example, if a physician delays
in diagnosing cancer and the patient dies, it may be difficult to decide
if the death is due to the delay or the cancer. Absent error, the patient
may have died from the burden of disease.
Not all professionals agree that preventable adverse events imply
error. Brennan, in particular, took issue with the JOM's equating pre-
Comm. on the Judiciary and the S. Comm. on the Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions,
108th Cong. 14 (2003) (statement of Linda McDougal, Woodville, WI) ("Medical
malpractice kills as many as 98,000 Americans each year.... A good start would be
to discipline health care providers who repeatedly commit malpractice."); Michigan
Trial Lawyers Association, Medical Malpractice: Medical Malpractice Insurance-
Why the Price Hikes?, at http://mtla.net/news4.html ("Medical malpractice is now the
eighth leading cause of death in America."); Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers,
AFTL Position Papers, Medical Malpractice Update, available at http://www.aftl.org/
legislativeUpdatespositionPapersdetail.asp?lD= 11 (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) ("The
1OM examined actual medical charts for a wider range of medical errors, resulting in
the conclusion that as many as 98,000 Americans are killed every year by medical
malpractice in hospitals.").
97 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 49 ("The problem is not bad people; the
problem is that the system needs to be made safer."). A striking example of a system
error occurred in the well-publicized death of Jessica Santillan at Duke University
Medical Center. She was treated by some of the best transplant physicians in the
world, but died due to a breakdown in the system to ensure she received a heart and
lung transplant from a donor with compatible blood type. See e.g., Edward W. Cam-
pion, A Death at Duke, 348 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1083 (2003).
98 See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 49.
99 Since its 1999 report, the IOM has issued two other comprehensive reports
designed to spur overhaul of the health care system: COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH
CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM
FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY (2001); PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 45.
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ventable adverse events with errors. In the HMPS, certain events
were labeled preventable even though there was no evidence that a
mistake was made. 00 What is preventable is also constrained by cost.
Adverse events that may be averted only at enormous cost may not be
truly preventable given the capabilities (and realities) of the modem
health care system.
101
Most experts concede that it is often difficult to distinguish ad-
verse events caused by error from those caused by the patient's medi-
cal condition.10 2 Although it is fairly straightforward to conclude that
giving a patient the wrong drug or operating on the wrong leg is an
error, other mistakes, such as a "wrong" diagnosis, are not so easily
categorized. Harm can occur from many interrelated factors, includ-
ing disease burden, age, co-existing conditions, and even bad luck.
10 3
In an article aptly titled, What is an Error?, 104 the authors posit
four scenarios in an attempt to answer their question:
A patient scheduled for an amputation of the right leg has the
left leg removed.
A patient is discharged from the hospital after myocardial in-
farction without having a P-blocker prescribed.
10 5
A hospitalized patient with multiple medical problems dies of
cardiac arrest. The endotracheal tube inserted during the re-
suscitation is found to be in the right bronchus.
100 Brennan, supra note 37, at 1123. In his use of the example of postopera-
tive hemorrhage, Brennan noted that with proper technique most such hemorrhages
can be prevented. However, surgeons can expect that a certain number will occur
even with the best surgical technique. All postoperative hemorrhages were labeled in
the HMPS as preventable even if there was no apparent mistake by the surgeon.
These cases were considered errors in the IOM report. Id.
101 Id. Brennan used the following illustration: If every patient were tested for
drug allergies before being given antibiotics, most drug reactions would be prevented.
Thus, allergic reactions to drugs could be considered preventable. But it is not cost-
effective to test all patients for allergies. Id.
102 See UNITED STATES GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTORS, ADVERSE DRUG EVENTS: THE MAGNITUDE OF HEALTH RISKS IS
UNCERTAIN BECAUSE OF LIMITED INCIDENCE DATA 26 (Jan. 2000), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/heO0021.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT] ("It can
often be difficult to distinguish adverse events caused by a drug from those caused by
the medical conditions that the drugs are intended to treat.").
103 Weingart & Iezzoni, supra note 86, at 1917.
104 Timothy P. Hofer et al., What is an Error?, 6 EFFECTIVE CLINICAL PRAC.
261, 262 (2000).
105 A P-blocker, or beta-blocker, is a drug that blocks beta-adrenergic recep-
tors of sympathetic impulses. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MED. DICTIONARY 38 (30th
ed. 2003). In this instance it would be used to reduce the heart rate and muscle con-
traction and to lower blood pressure.
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While waiting for correction of coagulopathy, a patient with
overwhelming infection, multiorgan failure, and pleural effu-
sion dies before having thoracentesis 10 6 to check for em-
pyema. 10
7
The first two incidents are clearly error. The authors note, how-
ever, that the first event, a "wrong-site" surgery, is a more egregious
error than the second, although the second is more common and the
patient is more likely to die without the beta-blocker.' °8 They ques-
tion whether the third scenario should even be called an error because
it did not cause harm, and certainly not the patient's death from car-
diac arrest. Even though the endotracheal tube was misplaced, it
probably had no affect on the outcome. 1°9 The fourth incident repre-
sents a debate about whether the intervention, thoracentesis, should be
used in a patient with bleeding. The authors note that the outcome
might affect the answer to whether this was an error: "[i]lf the patient
died without having the procedure, the omission might be labeled an
error: "[i]f the patient died of a bleeding complication after thoracen-
tesis, the decision to do the procedure might be considered an er-
ror."' 10 As these examples demonstrate, in many cases there is no
easy categorization of the event.
E. Reliability of Estimates of Medical Error from Other Studies
Recently, a study performed by an Internet health care quality rat-
ings company, HealthGrades, Inc., received considerable media atten-
tion."'1  Using sixteen of twenty AHRQ indicators,"l 2 HealthGrades
reviewed Medicare discharge data from all fifty states and the District
of Columbia. Contending that the IOM underestimated the number of
106 Thoracentesis is aspiration to remove fluid from the pleural cavity (space
between the lining of the outside of the lungs (pleura) and the wall of the chest). Id.
at 1904.
107 Empyema is a collection of pus in the pleural space. Id. at 607.
108 Hofer et al., supra note 104, at 262.
109 Id.
110 Id.
1 HEALTHGRADES STUDY, supra note 15.
112 The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) was established
in 1989 as the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research. Part of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, AHRQ is charged with supporting
research designed to improve the quality, safety and effectiveness of health care.
AHRQ PROFILE ADvANCING EXCELLENCE IN HEALTH CARE, at
http://www.ahrq.gov/about/profile.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). AHRQ annually
publishes patient safety indicators. AHRQ QUALITY INDICATORS: GUIDE TO PATIENT
SAFETY INDICATORS, AHRQ PUB. No. 03-R203 REvISION 2 (Oct. 22, 2004), available
at http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/downloads/psi/psiguide rev3.pdf.
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deaths due to medical error and that safety had not improved in the
past five years, HealthGrades concluded that more than 195,000 po-
tentially preventable deaths occur each year as a result of hospital
error. 11 3 The reliability of this study is questionable. First, it was not
published in a peer-reviewed medical journal, but on the website that
markets HealthGrades' hospital-rating service. 1 4  The project used
administrative abstracts, not patient charts, as a basis for its study." 5
Use of administrative data to identify quality problems is fraught with
reliability problems." 
6
The usefulness of the HealthGrades study is also hampered by its
extrapolation of Medicare data to the general population. Elderly pa-
tients are known to suffer more adverse events than younger patients
because they are sicker, have multiple diseases or co-morbid condi-
tions and are subjected to more complex procedures. 1 7 In addition,
the overwhelming majority of deaths of Medicare patients in the
HealthGrades report was due to "failure to rescue," defined by the
study as failure to diagnose and timely treat a complication." 8 Ac-
cording to the AHRQ, however, the failure to rescue indicator ex-
cludes anyone aged seventy-five years and older," 9 which calls into
question the use of this instrument in a population of Medicare pa-
tients who are generally over sixty-five. In an interview concerning
the HealthGrades report, Leape also points out that failure to rescue is
not an accepted standard for calculating medical errors. 
20
The study also fails to acknowledge the limitations placed by
AHRQ on use of its patient safety indicators, including the difficulty
113 Press Release, In-Hospital Deaths from Medical Errors at 195,000 Per
Year, HealthGrades Study Finds (July 27, 2004), available at
http://www.healthgrades.com/PressRoom/index.cfm?fuseaction=PressReleases (quot-
ing Dr. Samantha Collier).
114 HealthGrades: The Quality Care Experts, at http://www.healthgrades.com
(last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
115 HEALTHGRADES STUDY, supra note 15, at 9.
116 See Weingart & Iezzoni, supra note 86, at 1918; Patrick S. Romano &
David H. Mark, Bias in the Coding of Hospital Discharge Data and Its Implications
For Quality Assessment, 32 MED. CARE 81 (1994).
117 See Eric J. Thomas & Troyen A. Brennan, Incidence and Types of Pre-
ventable Adverse Events in Elderly Patients: Population Based Review of Medical
Records, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 741, 742-43 (2000).
118 HEALTHGRADES STUDY, supra note 15, at 3-4.
119 The AHRQ defines failure to rescue somewhat differently. The indicator
is intended to identify those who die in the hospital following a complication, but
excludes patients age seventy-five and older. AHRQ QUALITY INDICATORS: GUIDE TO
PATIENT SAFETY INDICATORS, supra note 112, at 33.
120 Amanda Gardner, U.S. Hospital Medical Errors Kill 195,000 Annually:
Report, HEALTHDAY (July 27, 2004), at http://www.forbes.com/lifestyle/health/
feeds/hscout/2004/07/27/hscout520330.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
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in extricating those adverse events in which error may have occurred
from those which occurred through no fault of the health care profes-
sional. 121 AHRQ recommends that its safety indicators be utilized
only as a screening mechanism for potentially preventable adverse
events. 1
22
In a peer-reviewed study published in 2003 in the Journal of the
American Medical Association, researchers - who also used AHRQ
patient safety indicators - examined 7.45 million abstracts for inpa-
tient stays in 2000 from 994 hospitals and estimated that "medical
injuries" may cause 32,591 deaths annually. 123 This study was much
larger than the HMPS or UCMPS and involved records from ap-
proximately twenty percent of all nonfederal acute-care hospitals in
the United States. 124 However, because they were using administra-
tive abstracts, the authors conceded they were not able to make a dis-
tinction between medical injuries that were preventable from those
that were treatment related.1
25
121 See AHRQ QUALITY INDICATORS: GuIDE TO PATIENT SAFETY INDICATORS,
supra note 112, at 23:
The information about the ability of these data to distinguish adverse events
in which no error occurred from true medical errors is limited. A number of
factors-such as the heterogeneity of clinical conditions included in some
codes, lack of information about event timing available in these data sets,
and limited clinical detail for risk adjustment-contribute to the difficulty in
identifying complications that represent medical error or may be at least in
some part preventable.
122 Id. (recognizing that the AHRQ PSI's are limited in their scope and only
offer information and guidance). The nonspecificity of administrative data and most
of the AHRQ patient safety indicators was confirmed by a technical study commis-
sioned by the AHRQ in 2002:
Few adverse events captured by administrative data are unambiguous
enough for a great deal of certainty that every case identified reflects medi-
cal error. Most adverse events identified by the PSIs [patient safety indica-
tors] have a variety of causes in addition to potential medical error leading
to the adverse event, including underlying patient health and factors that do
not vary systematically. Clinician panelists rated only two of the accepted
indicators as very likely to reflect medical error: 1.) "Transfusion reaction"
and 2.) "Foreign body left in during a procedure".... All other accepted
indicators identify adverse events which represent a spectrum of likelihood
of reflecting either medical error or potentially preventable complications of
care, but cannot be expected to identify only cases in these categories.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Measures of Patient Safety Based on
Hospital Administrative Data - The Patient Safety Indicators, AHRQ Publication No.
02-0038 8 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/tp/hospdatp.htm.
123 Chunliu Zhan & Marlene R. Miller, Excess Length of Stay, Charges, and
Mortality Attributable to Medical Injuries During Hospitalization, 290 JAMA 1868,
1872 (2003).
124 Id. at 1869.
125 Chunliu Zhan & Marlene R. Miller, Definitions of Medical Injuries, Let-
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Other clinical studies have produced wide variation in the number
of medical errors. A review of the literature regarding errors in pri-
mary care found estimates ranging from five to eighty per 100,000
consultations.126 An observational study of general surgical units in a
Chicago hospital concluded that 45.8% of patients suffered an adverse
event. 127 The prevalence of adverse drug events among hospital inpa-
tients ranges from 0.7% to 25%.128 Estimates vary widely as to how
many adverse drug events are preventable. 29 Hospital based studies
on adverse drug events may seriously underestimate their incidence
because large numbers of people take prescription medications on an
outpatient basis. One study found adverse drug events in twenty-five
percent of the outpatients surveyed, of which eleven percent were
allegedly preventable. 130
There are many reasons for the wide discrepancy in the empirical
data as to the prevalence of medical error. Direct comparison of
numbers is problematic because investigators use different research
methods. Many studies, including those relied on by the IOM, use
chart review to determine if an error occurred. As discussed previ-
ously, retrospective analysis of medical records is known to be less
than accurate. Using patient safety indicators or other administrative
data to identify medical errors is an insensitive way to capture error.
13 1
Observational studies, which usually capture a higher rate of adverse
events and errors, are costly and limited by necessity to a small popu-
lation. 132
Studies are conducted at different times and the passage of years
may skew the data.1 33 Divergent populations are used that do not in-
ters, In Reply, 291 JAMA 304 (2004). Accordingly, it can be assumed that the num-
ber of error-related deaths each year would be less than the 32,000 deaths found by
the study.
126 Sanders & Esmail, supra note 57, at 232.
127 Andrews et al., supra note 40, at 311. The numbers in this study cannot be
directly compared to other studies because the authors counted events in which the
patient suffered no harm, i.e., the event was not "adverse." Id. at 310.
128 B Dean, Adverse Drug Events: What's the Truth?, 12 QUALITY & SAFETY
IN HEALTH CARE 165 (2003).
129 David Classen, Medication Safety: Moving From Illusion to Reality, 289
JAMA 1154, 1155 (2003) (citing to literature showing thirteen to seventy percent of
medication errors are preventable).
130 Tejal K. Gandhi et al., Adverse Drugs in Ambulatory Care, 348 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1556, 1559-60 (2003).
131 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
132 An observational study uses observers on hospital units to record adverse
events or medical errors as they occur.
133 For example, the HMPS found an adverse drug event rate of 0.7% in hos-
pital patients, compared to rate of 6.5% documented in 1995. David W. Bates et al.,
Relationship between Mediation Errors and Adverse Drug Events, 10 J. GEN.
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vite easy comparison. Some clinical reports involve only inpatients in
intensive care units or surgical units, while others focus on the general
hospital population or outpatients.' 34 Many studies focus on specific
populations, such as the elderly or children. 3 5 While some research-
ers count only those errors or events that cause injury, others tabulate
errors that are potentially harmful.136 A drawback to extracting medi-
cal error from studies of preventable adverse drug events is that many
include patient error or misuse as well as provider error.
37
Finally, there is no consistent definition of adverse event or error
across the studies.' 38  Significant variations exist in nomenclature,
including the frequent interchangeability of the terms adverse event
and error.'39  Add to these factors the difficulty in determining
whether an error is causally related to the harm suffered by patient,
and it is easy to understand why the clinical estimates of medical error
are uncertain. 140
Whatever the true figure of preventable deaths, the divergent re-
sults of the studies sound a note of caution in measuring medical er-
ror. Some have called it "shortsighted" to focus solely on the accu-
racy of the number of deaths due to error when the IOM served the
more important function of focusing much-needed attention on the
INTERNAL MED. 199 (1995). The difference may be related, in part, to the increase in
the number of medications available, heightening the possibility of an adverse drug
event.
134 E.g., Andrews et at., supra note 40, at 311 (studying surgical and ICU
patients); David J. Cullen et al., Preventable Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized
Patients: A Comparative Study of Intensive Care and General Care Units, 25
CRITICAL CARE MED. 1289 (1997) (finding the rate of preventable adverse events in
an ICU twice the rate of a non-ICU).
135 See generally Jerry H. Gurwitz et al., Incidence and Preventability of
Adverse Drug Events Among Older Persons in the Ambulatory Setting, 289 JAMA
1107 (2003) (presenting data from a study focusing on elderly patients).
136 Andrews et al., supra note 40, at 310 (including adverse events even if
they did not result in harm). In contrast, in the HMPS, to count as an adverse event,
the patient must have suffered an injury or death. See Brennan et al., supra note 21
and accompanying text.
137 See, e.g., Gurwitz et al., supra note 135, at 1112-13 (lapses in patient
adherence constituted twenty-one percent of preventable errors).
138 See Dean, supra note 128, at 165 (discussing the term "harm" within the
definition of "adverse event" as being a cause of discrepancies).
139 See, e.g., Andrews et al., supra note 40, at 312 (incorrectly stating the
HMPS found errors (not adverse events) in 3.7% of hospital charts).
140 Adverse drug events may be less susceptible to judgment calls, particularly
when detected by computer software programs. See David W. Bates et al., Policy and
the Future of Adverse Event Detection Using Information Technology, 10 J. AM.
INFORMATICS Ass'N 226 (2003).
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problem of medical error.14t However, when health care professionals
and analysts argue whether the IOM estimates of deaths due to error
are exaggerated or conservative, it is difficult to arrive at a reasonably
accurate baseline by which we can determine if providers have
achieved or can ever achieve the IOM's goal of a fifty percent reduc-
tion in medical error.
II. REPORTING SYSTEMS: PROPER TREATMENT
FOR AN AILING SYSTEM?
To achieve the goal of reducing errors, the errors must first be
identified. A system that relies on facilities and professionals to re-
port events is one way to identify, track and monitor the incidence of
medical error. If the scientific studies raise questions about the accu-
racy of the number of preventable errors, can we look to spontaneous
reporting systems to give us a baseline and to measure a decline in
medical errors with some degree of reliability? Looking at current
systems, the answer to this question is, unfortunately, "No."
The IOM envisioned two parallel reporting systems: a nationwide,
mandatory system at the state level for reporting deaths and serious
injuries due to error, 142 and confidential, non-regulatory, voluntary
systems for reporting other mistakes, including "near misses.
'
"
143
These dual systems have differing purposes. The primary aim of a
system where reporting is mandatory is to hold providers accountable
for mistakes, including public disclosure and possible penalties in
specific cases. 144 On the other hand, the focus of voluntary systems is
on identifying systemic errors and vulnerabilities before they occur.
45
For near misses or minimal harm, the IOM felt data should be pro-
tected from disclosure, particularly in litigation.
46
Since the IOM report, there has been continuing debate in the lit-
erature as to whether reporting systems should be voluntary or manda-
tory.147  This article accepts the IOM's recommendation for state
141 Thomas et al., supra note 71, at 814.
142 The IOM contemplated that mandatory reporting would be done initially
by hospitals, with the system eventually expanding to other institutions and ambula-
tory care settings. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
143 Id. at 9-10. A "near miss" is an error that results in no harm. Id. at 87.
144 Id. at 8.
141 id. at 87.
146 Id. at 110 ("Protecting such information encourages disclosure of prob-
lems and a proactive approach to correcting problems before serious harm occurs").
147 See Bryan A. Liang, The Adverse Event of Unaddressed Medical Error:
Identifying and Filling the Holes in the Health-Care and Legal Systems, 29 J.L. MED.
& ETHics 346, 359, n.167 (2001) (advocating voluntary reporting); Barry R. Furrow,
Medical Mistakes: Tiptoeing Toward Safety, 3 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 181, 204-
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mandatory systems, but rejects its premise that providers should be
penalized for their errors or that data should be provided to the public.
A system that requires health care providers to report but ensures the
confidentiality of data satisfies both the need for regulatory oversight
and providers' concerns about the disclosure of errors.
Ultimately, professionals and organizations will not report under
either voluntary or mandatory systems if it is not in their best inter-
ests. There are risks for the professional and the facility in making
errors visible and the collection of accurate data under both systems
suffers when patient safety information is publicly available. To date,
the compilation of error data under both mandatory and voluntary
systems has been problematic, primarily due to provider underreport-
ing.
A. The Problem of Underreporting
Despite the existence of multiple reporting systems, underreport-
ing of adverse events and medical error is widely recognized in the
literature.148 The reasons for this include professionals' and facilities'
concerns about adverse publicity, fear of litigation and professional
sanctions, burden of reporting, uncertainty about what is required to
be reported and lack of feedback.
149
The myth of professional infallibility looms large in reporting
schemes. Admitting mistakes, let alone reporting them, is not in-
grained in the culture of medicine. 150 Professionals feel that admitting
error will lead to colleagues censuring them or regarding them as in-
competent.' 15  These fears are often justified since "[e]ven a minor
06 (2003) (advocating mandatory reporting).
148 See Melissa Chiang, Note, Promoting Patient Safety: Creating a Worka-
ble Reporting System, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 383, 393 (2001); Liang, supra note 148, at
351-53; Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Error Versus Malpractice, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 751, 764 (1997).
149 MIMI MARCHEV ET AL., NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY,
How STATES REPORT MEDICAL ERRORS TO THE PUBLIC: ISSUES AND BARRIERS 20
(2003). See also supra note 147.
150 See Leape, supra note 4, at 1851 ("Physicians are expected to function
without error."). See also J Bryan Sexton et al., Error, Stress and Teamwork in Medi-
cine andAviation: Cross Sectional Surveys, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 745, 747 (2000) (stat-
ing seventy-six percent of staff in the intensive care unit studied felt errors were not
discussed because of personal reputation).
151 Leape, supra note 4, at 1852. See also Joan Osborne et al., Nurses' Per-
ceptions: When is it a Medication Error?, 29 J. NURSING ADMIN. 33, 37 (1999) (find-
ing that eighty-six percent of nurses thought medication errors were not reported
because nurses were afraid of the reaction from supervisors or coworkers).
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error can place the physician's entire career in jeopardy if it results in
a serious bad outcome."'1
52
Concern over the legal protection of data, including the lack of
confidentiality of the reports, is a substantial impediment. 53 Profes-
sional associations criticized the IOM's call for a mandatory reporting
system because it was perceived as punitive and a continuation of the
blaming of individuals for medical errors, and not the systems in
which they worked. 54  This may have been an overreaction to the
IOM's report as the stated purpose of mandatory reporting is to hold
hospitals and other facilities, not health care workers, accountable for
serious errors.' 55  Nevertheless, the concern by professionals over
increased liability exposure is real. Although there is scant data on
the relationship between acknowledging errors and malpractice
claims, it is generally acknowledged that the mere fear of litigation
due to disclosure of data is the greatest barrier to reporting. 156
In addition to providers' concern about fostering lawsuits through
disclosure of errors is the apprehension that safety data could be sub-
ject to discovery in litigation.' 57 Legal protection for reports of ad-
verse incidents and errors varies among states and data provided to
internal quality assurance committees or patient safety organizations
may be discoverable.1 In particular, peer review statutes provide
152 Leape, supra note 4, at 1852.
153 See Chiang, supra note 148, at 396; Thomas R. McLean, The Implications
of Patient Safety Research & Risk Managed Care, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 227, 235-36
(2002) (arguing that the IOM call for mandatory reporting will increase medical mal-
practice litigation and sanctions against providers).
154 See, e.g., Medical Mistakes: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm.
On Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies, 106th
Cong. 28 (1999) (statement of Nancy Dickey, Immediate Past President, American
Medical Association) (expressing "serious concern" with the IOM's recommendation
for a mandatory reporting system).
155 See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 86-87.
156 Mimi Marchev, National Academy for State Health Policy, Medical Mal-
practice and Medical Error Disclosure: Balancing Facts and Fears (Nat'l Acad. for
State Health Policy, Portland, ME), Dec. 2003 at 2.
157 See Chiang, supra note 148, at 396-401.
158 Id. The tension between discovery of safety reports and physicians' fear
of the use of reports in malpractice litigation is starkly illustrated by the state constitu-
tional amendment Floridians approved in November 2004. The amendment, sup-
ported by the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, allows patients to have access to
any record of an adverse medical event (without patient identifiers) kept by a provider
or facility. Florida Dep't of State Division of Elections Initia-
tives/Amendments/Revisions, Patients' Right to Know About Adverse Medical Inci-
dents, available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initiativelistBallot.asp (last
visited Nov. 15, 2004). Such records were previously protected from disclosure un-
der Florida law. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0197 (West. Supp. 2005) (mandating the
establishment of an internal risk management program to address the reporting of
20051
HEALTH MATRIX
inconsistent protection. For example, in a malpractice claim against
Cook County Hospital in which a patient had been accidentally dis-
connected from a ventilator, the court allowed the discovery of inci-
dent reports submitted to a hospital peer review committee as well as
recommendations for corrective action of the committee. 159
Physicians and facility employees, primarily nurses, are also con-
cerned about job security and the use of reports in disciplinary and
adverse employment actions. 160 The tension between reporting errors
and their possible punitive effect has not gone unnoticed by state
lawmakers. For example, when the New Jersey legislature enacted a
mandatory reporting statute in 2004, it explicitly recognized the prob-
lem of underreporting: "[f]ear of sanctions induces health care profes-
sionals and organizations to be silent about adverse events, resulting
in serious under-reporting." 161
Institutions' fear of adverse publicity and its impact on revenue
makes them hesitate to report. 62 One study indicates they may have
reason to be concerned about loss of patients after negative publicity.
Media reports about adverse events at Veteran's Administration (VA)
hospitals were associated with lower enrollment rates. 163
Finally, professionals complain there is seldom any change seen
as a result of the reporting of adverse events or errors. In a survey of
state reporting systems, only two states used the data to develop qual-
ity improvement projects.' 64 This gives professionals a "what's the
use" excuse to avoid reporting.
adverse medical events).
159 Chicago Trust Co. v. Cook County Hosp., 698 N.E.2d 641(111. App. Ct.
1998). See also Adams v. St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr., 955 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1998)
(holding records in possession of the Board of Nursing, a third party, were discover-
able); Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of the State of
Nevada, 936 P.2d 844 (Nev. 1997) (finding occurrence reports prepared by hospital
after incident were not protected under hospital peer review statute). But see
Hofflander v. St. Catherine's Hosp., Inc., 664 N.W.2d 545, 580 (Wis. 2003) (holding
that JCAHO survey documents were immune from disclosure under peer review
statute).160 See McLean, supra note 153, at 235-36.
161 N.J STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24(e) (2005), available at
http://Iis.njleg.state.nj.us/cgi-bin/om isapi.dll?clientlD=61725695&Depth=4&TD =
WRAP&advquery=%22patient%20safety%20act/o22&headingswithhits=on&infobas
e=statutes.nfo&rank=&record={9DB 1 }&softpage=Doc FramePg42&wordsaroundh
its=2&zz = (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
162 See MARCHEV ET AL., supra note 149, at 20.
163 William B. Weeks & Peter D. Mills, Reduction in Patient Enrollment in
the Veterans Health Administration After Media Coverage of Adverse Medical
Events, 29 JOINT COMMISSION J. QUALITY & SAFETY 652 (2003).
164 JILL ROSENTHAL ET AL., STATE REPORTING OF MEDICAL ERRORS AND
ADVERSE EVENTS: RESULTS OF A 50-STATE SURVEY 15 (2000) (stating that only Mas-
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The IOM recognized the legal and cultural barriers to reporting,
but nevertheless recommended that, to ensure accountability, reports
of serious injury or death be made public.165  Some commentators
have questioned why the IOM would recommend a confidentiality
rule for near misses but not for situations in which errors lead to seri-
ous harm or death. If fear of litigation is the primary reason for un-
derreporting, providers need more protection when reporting an inci-
dent involving death or serious disability. Hospitals and other health
care providers have less reason to fear the reporting of incidents
where a patient suffers little or no harm because such incidents are
unlikely to result in litigation.'
66
With a few exceptions, states with mandatory reporting systems
have generally not accepted the IOM's recommendation of public
access to reports, viewing the problem of underreporting a greater
concern than accountability. 67 The majority of states have statutory
exemptions from discovery or other legal protection of reported
data.' 6 8 Those that provide public access to information often release
only aggregate data, 169 and the trend in recent legislation is toward
greater protection of data.' 70 There is a lack of uniformity in the pro-
tection of reports, however, and federal legislation shielding patient
safety data from disclosure is a crucial next step. 171
B. A Review of Federal and Private Reporting Systems
1. Federal Legislation
The IOM recommended several Congressional initiatives. First,
it encouraged Congress to create a Center for Patient Safety within
AHRQ that would establish and monitor national goals for patient
safety, with annual reports to Congress and the President. 72 As envi-
sioned by the IOM, the Center for Patient Safety would develop and
sachusetts and Ohio use data to develop quality improvement projects).
165 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
166 Jeffrey O'Connell & Patrick B. Bryan, More Hippocrates, Less Hypocrisy:
"Early Offers " As a Means of Implementing the Institute of Medicine's Recommenda-
tions on Malpractice Law, 15 J.L. & HEALTH 23, 33 (2000-01).
167 See Marchev, supra note 156, at 6 (describing state legal protections
against disclosure of reported data includes exemptions to open records acts, anony-
mous reporting, nondiscoverability of data, and peer review protections.).
168 See MARCHEV ET AL., supra note 149, at 12.
169 Id. Colorado is the only state that currently makes individual incident
reports available on a public website. Id. at 17.
170 See Marchev, supra note 156, at 7.
171 See discussion Part III. C.
172 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
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fund research activities to identify errors and to improve patient
safety. 1
73
Second, a role was expected for the federal government to assist
states in implementing mandatory reporting systems. The IOM rec-
ommended that Congress designate the National Forum for Health
Care Quality Measurement and Reporting as the entity responsible for
developing a core set of reporting standards to be used by the states;
require all providers to report standardized information; and provide
funds and technical expertise to states that establish mandatory sys-
tems. 1 74 Should a state choose not to have a mandatory system, the
IOM suggested the Department of Health and Human Services be
designated as the responsible entity. 175
Third, the 1OM recognized that for voluntary reporting of medical
error to be effective, health care providers would need to be reassured
that information would be kept confidential and not be used against
them in malpractice or disciplinary proceedings. 176 The IOM called
on Congress to establish a national database and to pass legislation to
extend peer review protection for data related to patient safety and
quality improvement. 177
Since 2000, a host of bills have been introduced in Congress to
improve patient safety in accordance with the LOM's recommenda-
tions.' 78 None of the bills have been enacted, although the House and
173 id.
174 Id. at 9. The National Forum for Health Care Quality Measurement and
Reporting is the umbrella organization of The National Quality Forum. See infra note
274.
175 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
176 See id. at 10.
177 Id. at 9-10.
178 See Medical Error Reduction Act of 2000, S. 2038, 106th Cong. (2000)
(seeking to reduce accidental injury and death resulting from medical mistakes); Stop
All Frequent Errors (SAFE) in Medicare and Medicaid Act of 2000, S. 2378, 106th
Cong. (2000) (amending the Social Security Act to improve the safety of the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs); Patient Safety and Errors Reduction Act, S. 2738,
106th Cong. (2000) (amending the Public Health Service Act to reduce medical mis-
takes and medication-related errors); Voluntary Error Reduction and Improvement in
Patient Safety Act, S. 2743, 106th Cong. (2000) (developing an infrastructure for
creating a national voluntary reporting system); Patient Safety and Quality Improve-
ment Act, S. 2590, 107th Cong. (2002) (providing for the improvement of patient
safety and reducing the incidence of events adversely affecting patient safety); Patient
Safety Improvement and Medical Injury Reduction Act, S. 3029, 107th Cong. (2002)
(seeking to improve patient safety and reduce the incidence of accidental medical
injury); Patient Safety Improvement Act of 2002, H.R. 4889, 107th Cong. (2002)
(attempting to amend the Social Security Act to improve patient safety); Patient
Safety and Quality Improvement Act, H.R. 5478, 107th Cong. (2002) (providing for
the improvement of patient safety and reducing the incidence of events adversely
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Senate each passed similar patient safety legislation in 2004.'79 The
Senate version was reintroduced in March 2005, and provides that
private or public patient safety organizations certified by the Secretary
of the Department of Health and Human Services may submit
nonidentifiable information to a network of national databases
established by the Secretary.1 80 All information reported to a patient
safety center would be privileged and protected from subpoena or
discovery in legal proceedings.'
2. Federal Agencies
A number of federal agencies have established reporting systems,
most of which predate the IOM report. Under the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration's (FDA) MedWatch program, professionals and patients
voluntarily report serious adverse reactions, product problems or
medication errors associated with an FDA-regulated drug or device.
1 82
The FDA and Centers for Disease Control (CDC) jointly administer
the Vaccine Adverse Event Report System (VAERS), which collects
and analyzes data from reports of adverse events following vaccina-
tion. 183 Rather than focusing solely on medication errors, these data-
affecting patient safety); Better HEALTH Act of 2003, S. 1374, 108th Cong. (2003)
(providing health care professionals with immediate relief from increased medical
malpractice insurance costs and dealing with the root causes of the current medical
malpractice insurance crisis); Health Care Coverage Expansion and Quality Im-
provement Act of 2003, S. 10, 108th Cong. (2003) (protecting consumers in managed
care plans and providing for parity with respect to mental health coverage); Patient
Safety Improvement Act of 2003, H.R. 877, 108th Cong. (2003) (seeking to improve
patient safety by amending the Social Security Act).
179 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, S. 720, 108th Cong. (2004)
(Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate); Patient Safety and Quality Im-
provement Act, H.R. 663, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter referred to as House ver-
sion]. On July 22, 2004, the Senate incorporated S. 720 in H.R. 663 as an amendment
and passed H.R. 663 in lieu of S. 720. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act
of 2004, H.R. 663, 108th Cong. (2004) (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by
Senate) [hereinafter referred to as Senate version], available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
180 Patient Safety and Improvement Act of 2005, S. 544, 109th Cong., § 923
(2005).
' Id. § 922(a)(l)-(2). See discussion infra Part III.C.
182 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, MEDWATCH, THE FDA SAFETY
INFORMATION AND ADVERSE REPORTING PROGRAM, at http://www.fda.gov/medwatch
(last visited Jan. 29, 2005). Although health care professionals and consumers volun-
tarily report to MedWatch, manufacturers are required to report all adverse events
associated with drugs. See Postmarketing Reporting of Adverse Drug Experiences,
21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (c) (2004) (establishing the reporting requirements for drug manu-
facturers).
183 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, VACCINE ADVERSE EVENT REPORT
SYSTEM (VAERS), FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.fda.gov/cber/
vaers/faq.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
2005]
HEALTH MA TRIX
bases are primarily concerned with adverse reactions to drugs and
vaccines or product problems.184 For example, "[s]ince 1990, VAERS
has received over 123,000 reports, most of which describe mild side
effects such as fever."' 18 5  The FDA monitors medication errors
through MedWatch and other reports that are forwarded to the
FDA. 1 6 The FDA receives 300,000 adverse drug reports each year,
of which only about 3,000 are cited as medication error.187 A review
of case reports over a six-year period revealed that almost ten percent
of medication errors reported to the FDA involved fatalities. 8 How-
ever, the investigators concluded that only about one-half of the
deaths were related to an error, while the rest were possibly related or
unrelated. 189
The Veteran's Administration (VA), often held up as a model for
hospital safety initiatives, 190 has both internal and external systems for
reporting adverse events. 191 Each VA facility is required to have a
reporting system for adverse events and close calls (also known as
"near misses"). 192 An analysis must be conducted to determine the
184 An adverse drug reaction is often distinguished from an adverse drug
event. See Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized
Patients, A Meta-Analysis of Prospective Studies, 279 JAMA 1200, 1200 (1998)
(stating an adverse drug event includes errors in administration while an adverse drug
reaction is an injury due to a properly prescribed and administered drug).
185 VACCINE ADVERSE EVENT REPORT SYSTEM, supra note 183.
186 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH,
MEDICATION ERRORS, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/MedErrors/
default.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
187 Stephen Barlas, FDA Planning Next Steps on How to Reduce Medication
Errors, 148 DRUG TOPICS 58 (2004), available at http://www.drugtopics.com/
drugtopics/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) (discussing proposed rules and guidance issued
by the FDA, aimed at decreasing medication errors).
188 Jerry Phillips et al., Retrospective Analysis of Mortalities Associated With
Medication Errors, 58 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 1835 (2001) (providing a
review of the causes and factors involved in fatal medication errors as reported from
1993 to 1998).
189 Id. at 1837. It is sometimes difficult to separate deaths that are associated
with but not caused by preventable adverse drug events from deaths that would have
been prevented had the adverse event not occurred. See GAO REPORT, supra note
102, at 26.
190 See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 80 (noting the Veteran's Health Ad-
ministration's establishment of four Patient Safety Centers of Inquiry, which focus on
researching and disseminating information to improve patient safety).
191 VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., NATIONAL CENTER FOR PATIENT SAFETY
(NCPS), available at http://www.patientsafety.gov (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) (pro-
viding information pertaining to NCPS's patient safety program); NASA, PATIENT
SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM, at http://psrs.arc.nasa.gov (last visited May 5, 2005)
(describing a method of reporting adverse events in regard to patients' safety).
192 DEPT. OF VETERAN'S AFFAIRS, VETERAN'S HEALTH ADMIN., VHA
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root cause of each incident.193 In 2002, the VA, in association with
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), imple-
mented the Patient Safety Reporting System (PSRS) where profes-
sionals are encouraged to report voluntarily any safety-related event,
including those that cause no harm, under promises of anonymity and
confidentiality. 
194
Since 1970, the CDC has operated the National Nosocomial In-
fections Surveillance (NNIS) database for nosocomial (hospital-
based) infections and antimicrobial use and resistance. 195 Approxi-
mately 315 acute care general hospitals participate in the NNIS Sys-
tem. 196 Aggregate data is released, but incidents due to medical error
are not separately reported.
197
3. Private reporting systems
The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organi-
zations (JCAHO) accredits more than 15,000 health care facilities in
the United States. 198 The JCAHO has implemented a voluntary sys-
NATIONAL PATIENT SAFETY IMPROVEMENT HANDBOOK 2 (Jan. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.patientsafety.gov/NCPShb.pdf (requiring that both adverse events and
close calls be reported in the Patient Safety Information System).
" Id. at 3.
194 NASA, PATIENT SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM, at http://psrs.arc.nasa.gov
(last visited May 5, 2005). NASA administers the Aviation Safety Reporting System
that has been widely viewed as a model of safety reporting for the health industry.
The IOM's proposal for a two-pronged reporting system of mandatory reporting for
serious events and deaths and voluntary reporting of near misses was patterned after
the aviation error reporting system. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 95-96 (describing
NASA's aviation safety reporting system).
195 DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.: CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE SETrINGS: ABOUT NNIS, at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/hip/NNIS/@nnis.htm (last visited Feb. 2 2005).
196 id.
197 The most recent summary of the data reported by hospitals participating in
the NNIS is available from US Department of Health and Human Services, Division
of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance
(NNIS) System Report, Data Summary from January 1992 through June 2004, 32 AM.
J INFECTIOUS CONTROL 470 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/
hip/NNIS/2004NNISreport.pdf.
In 1999, the CDC also initiated a system allowing hemodialysis centers to
record and track rates of infection in patients receiving dialysis. CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE QUALITY PROMOTION, ISSUES
IN HEALTH CARE SETTINGS, DIALYSIS SURVEILLANCE NETWORK, (2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/hip/Dialysis/dsn.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
198 Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Health Care Orgs., What is the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, at http://www.jcaho.org/
general+public/who+jc/what+is+the+joint+commission.htm (last visited May 5,
2005).
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tem of reporting sentinel events, defined broadly as "an unexpected
occurrence involving death or serious physical or psychological in-
jury, or the risk thereof."' 99 Although the reporting of a sentinel event
is voluntary, once a report is made the facility is required to conduct a
root cause analysis of the event. 200 From January 1995 through De-
cember 2004, JCAHO reviewed 2966 sentinel events reported by its
accredited facilities, 2279 of which involved a patient's death.2 1
Because of the broad definition of sentinel event, the JCAHO program
does not capture incidents that reflect only medical error. Many ex-
perts acknowledge that there has been serious underreporting to
JCAHO, which is directly tied to providers' fear of disclosure of the
reports in litigation.20 2
Recognizing that adverse drug events may the largest source of
iatrogenic error, United States Pharmacopeia (USP) operates two vol-
untary systems for reporting medication errors, Medication Errors
Reporting (MER) and MedMARx. 20 3 The MER program encourages
patients and health professionals to report errors to a national report-
ing program. 204 From its inception in 1991, through 2003, more than
8,000 reports were submitted to the program. 20 5 The MedMARx pro-
gram allows hospitals to anonymously report and track medication
errors through an internet-accessible format.206 In 2002, 192,477
medication errors were voluntarily reported to MedMARx by 482
199 Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Health Care Orgs., Sentinel Event Pol-
icy And Procedures, (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.jcaho.org/
accredited+organizations/sentinel+event/se_pp.htm#1.
200 id.
201 Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Health Care Orgs., Sentinel Event Sta-
tistics (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.jcaho.org/accredited+organizations/
sentinel+event/sentinel+event+statistics.htm (on file with author).
202 See Bryan A. Liang & Steven D. Small, Communicating About Care:
Addressing Federal-State Issues in Peer Review and Mediation to Promote Patient
Safety, 3 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 226-28 (2003) (contending underreporting to
JCAHO is due to lack of legal protection of the data from discovery or other disclo-
sure).
203 The MER program is administered by USP in cooperation with the Insti-
tute for Safe Medication Practices. THE UNITED STATES PHARMACOPEIAL
CONVENTION, PATIENT SAFETY: USP MEDICATION ERRORS REPORTING PROGRAM, at
http://www.usp.org/patientSafety/reporting/mer.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) (on
file with the author).
204 Id.
205 UNITED STATES PHARMACOPEIA PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVES 1, available
at http://www.usp.org/pdf/patientSafety/biPatientSafetyOverview.pdf (last visited
Nov. 15, 2004).
206 Id.
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hospitals and health systems.2 °7 Only 1.7% resulted in patient injury,
down from 2.4% in 2001.208 Twenty deaths were reported.20 9
As demonstrated by these reporting systems, both federal and pri-
vate, the incidence of adverse events, let alone the subcategory of
medical errors, is a far cry from those estimated by the IOM. For ex-
ample, the IOM estimated there were 7,000 deaths annually due to
medication errors. 210 Neither the FDA's MedWatch nor the USP pro-
grams capture such a large number of fatal errors. The gap between
the number of errors reported and the purported actual incidence of
error is often explained by the serious problem of underreporting of
errors. For example, the FDA estimates that it receives reports of only
one percent of suspected adverse drug reactions.21' In addition to
understating the problem of medical error, these systems may not be
effective in determining the general incidence of medical error be-
cause the focus is on specific treatments or populations.
207 Press Release, U.S. Pharmacopeia, USP Releases Fourth Annual Report
on Medication Errors in U.S. Hospitals (Nov. 18, 2003), available at
http://www.onlinepressroom.net/uspharm.
208 Id.
209 Id. In 2003, 235,159 medication error reports were submitted to USP.
U.S. PHARMACOPEIA 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2004), available at
http://www.usp.org/pdf/annualReport/04AnnualReport.pdf (last visited May 5, 2005).210 IOM REPORT, supra, note 1, at 2. This figure was based on a study that
reviewed death certificates that indicated in 1993, there were 7391 deaths due to
medication errors in the United States. David P. Phillips et al., Increase in US Medi-
cation-Error Deaths Between 1983 and 1993, 351 LANCET 643, 643 (1998) (the study
compared trends in medication errors with trends in related causes of death). The
IOM has also been criticized for relying on this study because the authors' definition
of medication error included "accidental poisonings" by patients, including accidental
overdose of drugs. See McDonald et al., supra note 39, at 94; see also Henri R. Ma-
nasse, Correspondence: Increase in US Medication-Error Deaths, 351 LANCET 1655,
1655 (1998); R.E. Ferner & C. Anton, Correspondence: Increase in US Medication-
Error Deaths, 351 LANCET 1655, 1655-56 (1998); Cleone Rooney, Correspondence:
Increase in US Medication-Error Deaths, 351 LANCET 1655, 1656-57 (1998). Other
studies have concluded that although medication errors are common, they do not
generally cause serious harm. See, e.g., David W. Bates et al., Relationship between
Mediation Errors and Adverse Drug Events, 10 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 199, 199
(1995) (0.9% of medication errors caused harm). See also supra note 207 and ac-
companying text (among MedMARx medication errors, 1.7% caused harm).
11 Adverse Events: Surveillance Systems for Adverse Events and Medical
Errors, J. Hearing Before The House Subcomm. on Health and Environment and
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. On Commerce and the Subcomm. on
Health of the Comm. on Veterans'Affairs Representatives, 106th Cong. 92, 95 (2000)
(statement of Janet Heinrich, Associate Director, Health Financing and Public Health
Issues, General Accounting Office).
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C. State Mandatory Reporting Systems - Counting the Errors
The IOM called for all states to have mandatory reporting systems
in place as part of a nationwide effort to collect information on events
that result in death or serious harm.212 There are currently twenty-two
states that require the reporting of some type of adverse event or inci-
dent. 213 Contrary to the IOM's recommendation, the federal govern-
ment has not stepped in to provide a mechanism for reporting in states
that have failed to implement a mandatory system.21 4
It is difficult to assess the success of state reporting systems. In-
stead of establishing separate systems for the reporting of serious
events and minor incidents, many states have a single system for both.
Some states collect not only reports of serious events or deaths, but
also incidents that cause no or minimal harm. Further, the IOM envi-
sioned accountability in the form of public access to data collected by
the states. In many states, however, the information is protected from
disclosure to the public.2 1 5 No study has used the data collected by
the states, primarily because the data is not made public in a useable
form. 2
16
The information compiled to date from those few systems that re-
lease patient safety data does not reveal the substantial number of
errors suggested by the IOM. In fact, the number of reported adverse
events, which may or may not be errors, is considerably less than the
IOM report suggests for errors alone. New York, home of the HMPS,
collected a total of 28,689 incident reports (1,159 reports per 100,000
discharges) in 2001 through its NYPORTS internet-based system.217
212 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
213 According to the National Academy for State Health Policy, which tracks
state reporting systems, the states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah and Washington. See NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, QUALITY &
PATIENT SAFETY: POLICIES, at http://www.nashp.org (last modified Mar. 31, 2004)
(on file with author). Some states have established voluntary reporting systems. E.g.,
OR. REv. STAT. § 442.820(2)(a) (2003).
214 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
215 See Marchev, supra note 156, at 6. The protection afforded by statute may
be ephemeral. In a survey of fifteen states that have statutory protection, six were not
sure whether the legal protection afforded would withstand requests under their free-
dom of information acts. ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 164, at 12.
216 Zhan & Miller, supra note 123, at 1868.
217 N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, NYPORTS: THE NEW YORK PATIENT
OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND TRACKING SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT 2000/2001:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/hospitaU
nyports/annual-report/2000-200 1/annual report.htm (last modified Sept. 2003).
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The number of errors alone is not publicly disclosed, although offi-
cials acknowledged that "the volume of medical errors in the system
is a small percentage compared to the overall volume of reporting.
'21 8
The number of incidents equates to slightly more than a one percent
adverse event rate, compared to the HMPS adverse event rate of 3.7%,
with more than half of HMPS events considered preventable.
During 2002, the first year of Utah's new program of reporting
sentinel events, there were thirty-four such events, with eighteen
deaths reported among nearly 450,000 inpatient hospital and outpa-
tient surgical center discharges. 219 The Utah Department of Health
has calculated that using the data from the UCMPS, it would be ex-
pected to have 327 deaths a year related to medical error, or nearly
eighteen times the sentinel event deaths reported in 2002.220 To offi-
cials, the discrepancy not only meant improving reporting in Utah, but
also "taking a closer look at the methodology that informed the IOM's
conclusions." 221 In Colorado, the other state involved in the UCMPS,
and where facility-specific data is collected and reported online, the
number and nature of the reports is either disheartening or encourag-
ing, depending on the accuracy of the information.222 For example,
Presbyterian/St Luke's Medical Center, the largest hospital in Den-
ver,223 reported thirty-three occurrences to the Department of PublicHealth in 2003 .224 Of these, twenty-six were missing person reports
218 Id.
219 Utah Dep't of Health, Utah Rule Provides First Year of Patient Safety Data,
UTAH PATIENT SAFETY UPDATE, JAN. 2003, at 2, available at http://health.utah.gov/
psi/pubs/psup vln2.pdf.
220 Id.
221 Id. The rates of sentinel events and deaths have remained consistent from
2002 through 2004. Utah Dep't of Health, State-Level Sentinel Event Information
2001-2004, UTAH PATIENT SAFETY UPDATE, Oct. 2004, at 2, available at
http://health.utah.gov/psi/pubs/PSU6 v2n2.pdf.
222 Under Colorado law, reportable occurrences include unexplained deaths,
brain or spinal cord injuries, life-threatening complications of anesthesia or transfu-
sion errors/reactions, severe bums, missing persons, physical, verbal or sexual abuse,
neglect, misappropriation of property, diverted drugs and malfunction/misuse of
equipment. Facilities must report these occurrences within one business day. The
Department of Public Health must investigate the occurrence and determine if appro-
priate action has been taken. Summaries of the occurrences are available for public
viewing. The summaries do not reflect the names of the patients or health care profes-
sionals involved. COL. REv. STAT. § 25-1-124 (2004).
223 Colo. Dep't of Pub. Health and Env't, COLORADO HEALTH FACILITY
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION-GENERAL (2004), at http://www.hfd.cdphe.state.co.us/
hfd2003/srch.aspx (ranked by number of beds).
224 Colorado Dep't of Health and Environment, Health Facility Information for.
PRESBYTERIAN/ST LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, at http://www.hfd.cdphe.state.co.us/
hfd2003/dtl.aspx?id=010431 &ft=-hospital (last visited May 5, 2005).
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due to patient elopement.225  No deaths were reported from any
cause.
226
Connecticut, where reporting of adverse events began in October
2002, fielded 1359 reports as of March 8, 2004.227 Follow-up was
performed in about fifty percent of the reports in an effort to distin-
guish adverse events from medical error.228 There was a steep decline
in reporting after the first twelve months, which stabilized at less than
half of the original monthly reports. 229 The decline was attributed not
only to underreporting, but also to confusion over what was a report-
able event.230
A comparison of reportable events between Florida and New
York demonstrates the difficulty in trying to assess the scope of re-
porting and its relationship to patient safety. In 1999, the last year for
which comparable annual data are available, 231 Florida received 3,808
reports of adverse events.232 In that year, Florida had more hospitals
and almost as many hospital beds as New York,233 which saw 16,939
reportable incidents.234 One cannot conclude from this data that in
1999, hospitals in Florida were safer than those in New York. Differ-
ences in the definition of events, ease of reporting, or underreporting
225 Id.
226 Id. At University of Colorado Hospital, also in Denver, twenty-two occur-
rences, including one death, were reported and investigated in 2003. The majority of
incidents reported were also due to patient elopement. COLO. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
ENv'T, OCCURRENCE SUMMARY REPORTS FOR: HEALTH FACILITY INFORMATION FOR:
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO HOSPITAL AUTHORITY at http://www.hfd.cdphe.state.co.us/
hfd2003/dtl.aspx?id= 010432&ft=-hospital (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
227 CONN. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, ANNUAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT To THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY: ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING 5 (March 2004), available at
http://www.dph.state.ct.us/AgencyNews/2004ADVERSE%20EVENTREPORT.pdf.
228 Id. at 5. There is no breakdown for medical errors alone.
229 Id. at 11.
230 Id. at 12. Connecticut has recently amended its legislation with a new
definition of adverse event. See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
231 Florida maintains a public website where statewide summaries of reports
are posted. The state has not yet publicly released total reports for the years 2000 and
later. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN.: DIv. OF MANAGED CARE & HEALTH
QUALITY, MANDATORY SERIOUS PATIENT INJURY REPORTING: SUMMARY REPORT,
HOSPITALS AND AMBULATORY SURGICAL CENTERS, available at
http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/MCHQ/HealthFacilityRegulation/Risk/annualreport.sh
tml (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
232 Id.
233 JILL ROSENTHAL ET AL., COST IMPLICATIONS OF STATE MEDICAL ERROR
REPORTING PROGRAMS: A BRIEFING PAPER 8 (2001) (stating Florida had 273 hospitals
and 52,000 hospital beds; New York had 260 hospitals and 66,757 beds).
234 N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 217.
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offer reasonable, but not conclusive, explanations for the gap in num-
bers recounted by these two states.
Although it is widely thought that mandatory reporting systems
are unreliable, these systems may capture more patient-related injuries
than voluntary systems. A recent study compared the number of inci-
dents reported voluntarily by JCAHO-accredited hospitals to JCAHO
with those reported to fifteen mandatory-reporting states. 235 Noting
that there was "considerable state-to-state variation in reporting re-
quirements,, 236 the researchers attempted to limit the data to nine
states that defined events similar to the sentinel event used by
237 hoftenJCAHO. In each of the nine states, the number of events reported
to the state agencies was equal to or greater than the number reported
to JCAHO. 238 In New York, the number of care-related deaths re-
ported to the New York State Health Department in 1999 exceeded
the total number of sentinel events reported to JCAHO by all nation-
ally accredited hospitals in that year.239
Other than the mandatory nature of the state reporting systems,
there are several reasons why providers may prefer to report to state
agencies rather than JCAHO. State law often offers protection from
lawsuit-related discovery that JCAHO, a private organization, can-
not.24° JCAHO's system is voluntary, but if JCAHO discovers a senti-
nel event that was not reported, it can require an investigation of the
event or an on-site visit at the hospital's expense. 24  Loss of accredi-
tation by JCAHO can have grave financial consequences for a hospital
because Medicare reimbursements depend on JCAHO accredita-
242tion.
235 L. Keoki Williams et al., Differences in the Reporting of Care-Related
Patient Injuries to Existing Reporting Systems, JOINT COMMISSION J. QUALITY &
SAFETY 460, 460 (2003).
236 Id. at 461.
237 Id.
23 Id. at 462-63.
239 Id. at 463.
240 Id.
241 ld.
242 Id. A hospital is "deemed" to have met the requirements for Medicare
certification if it is accredited by JCAHO. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(e), 1395bb (2000).
This may change. A recent report by the General Accountability Office criticized
JCAHO for missing many serious safety deficiencies. U.S. Gov. GEN.
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICARE: CMS NEEDS ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO
ADEQUATELY OVERSEE PATIENT SAFETY IN HOSPITALS (2004), available al
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04850.pdf. Congressional legislation to increase
CMS oversight has been proposed. Medicare Hospital Accreditation Act of 2004,
H.R. 4877, 108th Cong. (2004).
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Most experts believe that the low incidence of reporting is due not
to a tremendous decrease in adverse incidents or medical errors, but to
widespread underreporting.243 The difficulty with this explanation is
that, at this point, no one knows how many events should be reported
by health care providers. 24 Care must also be taken in interpreting
the data from those states that show an increase in number of events
reported. A surge in the number of reports does not mean that hospi-
tals are becoming less safe. In this instance, more may be better.
Contrary to the IOM's expectations, in the years after its report, one
should expect the numbers to increase, rather than decrease, due to
renewed commitment to reporting such events.245
D. The Lack of Standardized Data in State Systems
State systems not only suffer from underreporting, they are also
plagued by inconsistent, vague and cumbersome reporting formats.
The task for any reporting system is to define and measure reportable
error. However, programs are not in place to capture error. Although
twenty-two states have mandatory reporting systems, none addresses
medical error alone. There is also no uniform definition across report-
ing systems of an "error" or "adverse event." The lack of standard
nomenclature limits the usefulness of information collected by the
states and makes it difficult, if not impossible, to compare results
246
across the reporting systems.
The IOM called on Congress to require all health care organiza-
24tions to use a common language for reporting serious events.247 How-
ever, with the exception of a few states, health care workers are in-
stead being required to report under the general rubric of adverse
243 See supra notes 148, 149 and accompanying text.
244 New York may come closest to having a reasonable estimate because it
compares variations in reporting among hospitals and is able to target those hospitals
that have low reporting rates. See N.Y. DEP'T OF HEALTH, NYPORTS: THE NEW
YORK PATIENT OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND TRACKING SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT
2000/2001: COMPLETENESS OF REPORTING, available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/
nysdohihospital/nyports/annual report/2000-2001/annual report.htm (last modified
Sept. 2003). Even so, New York acknowledges that it is difficult to assess the com-
pleteness of reporting because "a gold standard database that includes cases that
should be reported, does not exist." Id.
245 "[W]ith better awareness, recognition, documentation, and tracking, the
rates of adverse events will initially increase for the first few years as data continues
to be collected." Utah Dep't of Health, supra note 219, at 2.
246 See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 89.
247 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 (recommending that Congress require
organizations "to report standardized information on a defined list of adverse
events").
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events or incidents, only a portion of which are caused by medical
error. The type and definition of reportable events in state legislation
vary considerably.248 Some systems mandate the reporting of general
events, such as unanticipated deaths, while others include a list of
specific incidents that must be reported.249 Some states count only
serious adverse events, whereas others have no severity threshold.25 °
For example, Florida broadly defines a reportable adverse incident
as an event that is associated with medical intervention, rather than the
condition for which the intervention occurred.251 Kansas considers a
reportable incident as one falling below the standard of care or a dis-
ciplinary violation.252 Several states require the reporting of sentinel
events, using the same definition found in JCAHO standards.253 Other
systems have incorporated a list of events for providers to report.2 54
New Jersey's recent legislation requires health care providers to
distinguish between adverse events, preventable adverse events, seri-
ous preventable adverse events, and near misses. 255 The law mandates
the reporting of serious preventable adverse events and encourages the
voluntary reporting of other adverse events and near misses.2 56 Penn-
248 See JILL ROSENTHAL & MAUREEN BOOTH, DEFINING REPORTABLE ADVERSE
EVENTS: A GUIDE FOR STATES TRACKING MEDICAL ERRORS 9-18 (2003), available at
http://www.nashp.org/Files/GNL50.pdf (displaying results of survey of the states).
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0197(5) (West. Supp. 2005).
252 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4921(f) (Supp. 2003) ("'Reportable incident' means
an act by a health care provider which: (1) Is or may be below the applicable standard
of care and has a reasonable probability of causing injury to a patient; or (2) may be
grounds for disciplinary action by the appropriate licensing agency.").
253 E.g., NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. 439.830 (Michie Supp. 2003) (defining a
sentinel event).
254 E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-40 (Supp. 2004).
255 These terms are defined as follows:
"Adverse event" means an event that is a negative consequence of care that
results in unintended injury or illness, which may or may not have been
preventable .... Near-miss" means an occurrence that could have resulted
in an adverse event but the adverse event was prevented. "Preventable
event" means an event that could have been anticipated and prepared
against, but occurs because of an error or other system failure. "Serious
preventable adverse event" means an adverse event that is a preventable
event and results in death or loss of a body part, or disability or loss of bod-
ily function lasting more than seven days or still present at the time of dis-
charge from a health care facility.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.25a (2004), available at http://lis.njleg.state.nj.us/cgi-
bin/omisapi.dll?clientID=61727294&Depth=4&TD=WRAP&advquery=%2226%3a
2H-12.25%22&headingswithhits=on&infobase=statutes.nfo&rank=&record ={9DB4}
&softpage=Doc Frame Pg42&wordsaroundhits=2&zz = .
Id.
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sylvania also distinguishes between events based on the extent of
harm to the patient. 7 Under Pennsylvania law, health care workers
are required to report serious events to their medical facility within
twenty-four hours, with the facility making a report to state agen-
cies8 There are penalties for failing to report a serious event, but
not for failing to report an incident.259
New York requires all hospitals to report certain incidents to the
public health department, including "patients' deaths or impairments
of bodily functions in circumstances other than those related to the
natural course of illness, disease or proper treatment in accordance
with generally accepted medical standards." 260  On the other hand,
Kansas requires the reporting of incidents even if no harm results.261
A recent study demonstrates the problem providers may have with
a discrepant reporting taxonomy. Investigators, seeking to assist cli-
nicians in the requirements for reporting adverse drug events, at-
tempted to classify five different untoward drug events: adverse
events, adverse drug reaction, adverse drug event, medication error,
and side effect.262 They noted that the FDA's MedWatch program is
257 The Pennsylvania statute defines reportable occurrences as follows:
"Incident." An event, occurrence or situation involving the clinical care of a
patient in a medical facility which could have injured the patient but did not
either cause an unanticipated injury or require the delivery of additional
health care services to the patient. The term does not include a serious
event .... Serious event." An event, occurrence or situation involving the
clinical care of a patient in a medical facility that results in death or com-
promises patient safety and results in an unanticipated injury requiring the
delivery of additional health care services to the patient. The term does not
include an incident.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.302 (West Supp. 2004).
258 Id. §§ 1303.308(a),1303.313(a).
259 If a medical facility discovers that a professional did not report a serious
event, that facility must report the professional to his or her licensing board. §
1303.313(e). Facilities may also be subjected to an administrative penalty of $1,000
per day for failing to report a serious event. § 1303.313(f).
260 N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2805-1(2)(a) (McKinney 2002). New York
also provides a list of events by code that must be reported. N.Y. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
NYPORTS: THE NEW YORK PATIENT OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND TRACKING
SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT 2000/2001: ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURES ASSOCIATED WITH
NYPORTS CODES, available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/hospital/
nyports/annual report/2000-2001/annual report.htm (last modified Sept. 2003).
261 See supra note 252.
262 Jonathan R. Nebeker et al., Clarifying Adverse Drug Events: A Clinician's
Guide to Terminology, Documentation, and Reporting, 140 ANN. INTERNAL MED.
795, 796 (2004). Adverse event is defined as "[h]arm in a patient administered a drug
but not necessarily caused by a drug." Adverse drug reaction is "[h]arm directly
caused by a drug at normal doses." Adverse drug event is "[h]arm caused by the use
of a drug." Medication error is "[i]nappropriate use of a drug that may or may not
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interested in unexpected serious adverse drug reactions, not adverse
drug events,263 while adverse drug events (but not side effects) "are
the targets of broader efforts to improve patient safety.,, 264 Such pars-
ing of terms, however well intentioned, may further lead to providers'
difficulty in knowing what to report.
The cost associated with collecting ambiguous reports is also a
significant burden on states.265 The IOM contemplated that data col-
lected under state systems would be released to the public only when
the state agency completes an investigation and determines that an
error has occurred.266  Questionable reports require follow-up and
analysis to separate the preventable from non-preventable. Collecting
data and analyzing each report is an expensive process, however, and
states have often not allocated sufficient resources to this task.z67 In a
survey of states that had considered but rejected reporting systems, a
primary impediment to implementation was inadequate funding. 68
Even with sufficient funding, the methods currently in place to cap-
ture medical error often produce imprecise data. Interviews with care-
takers or retrospective review of records containing adverse events or
adverse drug reactions may be unreliable in attempting to sort the
preventable from the unpredictable.269
The IOM recognized that mandatory reporting systems existing in
1999 had wide variations in definitions and processes. 270 This prob-
lem has not improved much in five years. In its 2004 report, Patient
Safety: Achieving a New Standard for Care, the IOM found that state
systems still had different definitions for patient safety terms such as
adverse event, had many different classifications of adverse events
and had diverse approaches to collecting data.27'
The lack of a uniform taxonomy hampers the ability to measure
error and to determine if reporting has any positive impact on patient
safety. In addition, numbers from one state cannot be compared to
another because there is no national classification of errors. Without
result in harm." Side effect is "[a] usually predictable or dose-dependent effect of a
drug that is not the principal effect for which the drug was chosen; the side effect may
be desirable, undesirable, or inconsequential." Id. at 796.
263 Id. at 799.
264 Id. at 800.
265 ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 233, at 6.
266 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 91-93, 110, 254-265.
267 MARCHEV ET AL., supra note 149, at 29.
268 ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 164, at 17.
269 See discussion supra Part 1. B., C.
270 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 91-93 (discussing the various state adverse
event tracking programs).
271 PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 45, at 248.
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standardized data, we cannot accurately assess the magnitude of the
problem or measure the results.
IV. PROGNOSIS FOR REPORTING
A. A Framework For Capturing Medical Error Through Mandatory
Reporting Systems
The preceding discussion demonstrates there are significant im-
pediments to the collection of dependable and consistent data on
medical error. To address this problem, states must begin to shift the
focus from gathering reports on ambiguous adverse incidents to cap-
turing a smaller set of objectively quantifiable data. Considerable
evidence suggests that states should not use terms such as adverse
event or sentinel event in legislation because they are vague and do
not accurately reflect the true incidence of error.2 72 If states are to
adopt and implement mandatory reporting systems, there is a need to
concentrate on a narrow, unambiguous list of errors that do not in-
volve individual judgment as to whether a reportable event occurred.
In response to the IOM's call for the development of standardized
data definitions to be used by states,273 The National Quality Forum
(NQF) has published a list of serious, largely preventable adverse
medical events that should be reported under any mandatory or volun-
tary system. 74 This list provides one of the first frameworks for re-
porting systems and includes twenty-seven "never" events that should
always be reported:
1. SURGICAL EVENTS
A. Surgery performed on the wrong body part
B. Surgery performed on the wrong patient
C. Wrong surgical procedure performed on a patient
D. Retention of a foreign object in a patient after sur-
gery or other procedure
272 See discussion supra Part I. D.
273 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
274 THE NATIONAL QUALITY FORUM, SERIOUs REPORTABLE EVENTS IN
HEALTHCARE: A CONSENsus REPORT 6-7 (2002). The NQF is a non-profit organiza-
tion whose twenty-three member board includes health care consumers, purchasers,
providers, health plans, and experts, with representatives from two federal agencies,
CMS and AHRQ. THE NATIONAL QUALITY FORUM, ABOUT THE NATIONAL QUALITY
FORUM, at http://www.qualityforum.org/about/home.htm#councils (last visited Feb.
15, 2005).
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E. Intraoperative or immediately post-operative death
in an ASA Grade 1275
2. PRODUCT OR DEVICE EVENTS
A. Patient death or serious disability associated with the
use of contaminated drugs, devices, or biologics
provided by the healthcare facility
B. Patient death or serious disability associated with the
use or function of a device in patient care in which
the device is used or functions other than as intended
C. Patient death or serious disability associated with in-
travascular air embolism that occurs while being
cared for in a healthcare facility
3. PATIENT PROTECTION EVENTS
A. Infant discharged to the wrong person
B. Patient death or serious disability associated with
patient elopement (disappearance) for more than
four hours
C. Patient suicide, or attempted suicide resulting in se-
rious disability, while being cared for in a healthcare
facility
4. CARE MANAGEMENT EVENTS
A. Patient death or serious disability associated with a
medication error (e.g., errors involving the wrong
drug, wrong dose, wrong patient, wrong time, wrong
rate, wrong preparation or wrong route of admini-
stration)
B. Patient death or serious disability associated with a
hemolytic reaction due to the administration of
ABO-incompatible blood or blood products
C. Maternal death or serious disability associated with
labor or delivery in a low-risk pregnancy while be-
ing cared for in a healthcare facility
275 ASA refers to assessment of fitness for anesthesia and surgery. ASA
Grade 1 is a healthy individual who has a predicted 0.06-0.08% mortality risk from
surgery. CLINICAL ANESTHESIOLOGY 8-9 (G. Edward Morgan et al., eds., 3d ed.
2002).
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D. Patient death or serious disability associated with
hypoglycemia, the onset of which occurs while the
patient is being cared for in a healthcare facility
E. Death or serious disability (kemicterus) associated
with failure to identify and treat hyperbilirubinimia
in neonates
F. Stage 3 or 4 pressure ulcers acquired after admission
to a healthcare facility
G. Patient death or serious disability due to spinal ma-
nipulative therapy
5. ENVIRONMENTAL EVENTS
A. Patient death or serious disability associated with an
electric shock while being cared for in a healthcare
facility
B. Any incident in which a line designated for oxygen
or other gas to be delivered to a patient contains the
wrong gas or is contaminated by toxic substances
C. Patient death or serious disability associated with a
bum incurred from any source while being cared for
in a healthcare facility
D. Patient death associated with a fall while being cared
for in a healthcare facility
E. Patient death or serious disability associated with the
use of restraints or bedrails while being cared for in
a healthcare facility
6. CRIMINAL EVENTS
A. Any instance of care ordered by or provided by
someone impersonating a physician, nurse, pharma-
cist, or other licensed healthcare provider
B. Abduction of a patient of any age
C. Sexual assault on a patient within or on the grounds
of a healthcare facility
D. Death or significant injury of a patient or staff mem-
ber resulting from a physical assault (i.e., battery)
that occurs within or on the grounds of a healthcare
facility
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The NQF designed its list to be used by all health care facilities in
states that adopt it as part of a reporting system.276 The list is not in-
tended to be exhaustive and states may expand the type of events to be
included.z77 Minnesota was the first state to adopt the entire NQF list
as part of its patient safety legislation.278 In January 2005, the Minne-
sota Department of Health reported that between July 2003 and Octo-
ber 2004, ninety-nine events on the NQF list had been reported state-
wide, with twenty deaths.279
Connecticut, which had only begun collecting data from its re-
porting system in 2002, quickly recognized the problem with vague
definitions. Less than two years after enacting patient safety legisla-
tion, the statute was amended to define an adverse event as any event
on the NQF list or a list adopted by the Commissioner of Public
Health. 280 The legislature was prompted by the Department of Public
Health's 2004 annual report, which had addressed the difficulty in
distinguishing adverse events from medical errors.28 ' The report also
questioned whether Connecticut's reporting scheme was so unneces-
sarily complicated as to reduce the reliability and comparability of
282
adverse event reporting. The adoption of the NFQ list ostensibly
alleviates these concerns.28 3
Although most events on the NFQ list are clear-cut indications of
a serious mistake, such as operating on the wrong patient, it is debat-
able whether all of the events on the NQF list can truly be categorized
as medical error. If error is defined as inadvertent or unintended con-
duct, criminal acts may not belong in a medical error reporting sys-
tem. Intentional harm to a patient should be reported to law enforce-
ment officials or licensing boards, who have the authority to impose
276 Serious Reportable Events in Healthcare, supra note 274, at 9.
277 Id. at 5, 8.
278 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.706-144.7069 (West Supp. 2004), amended by
2004 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 186 (West 2004). In 2003, Texas adopted a medical
error reporting statute that incorporates some, but not all, of the events on the NQF
list. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.202 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
279 ADVERSE HEALTH EVENTS IN MINNESOTA, FIRST ANNUAL PUBLIC REPORT 9
(Jan. 2005), available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/patientsafety/aereportO 105.pdf
(last visited May 15, 2005).
280 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-127n(a)(1) (West, WESTLAW through
Feb. Reg. Session and May 11 Sp. Session).
281 CONN. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 227, at 9.
282 Id. at 10.
283 Reporting began under Connecticut's new program in July 2004. The
Department of Public Health estimates that it will receive 50-100 reports each year.
CONN. DEP'T OF HEALTH, ANNUAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY:
ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING 7 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.dph.state.ct.us/
oppe/quality/Adverse%20Event%20Report-Oct%202004.pdf (last visited May 15,
2005).
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284criminal or disciplinary sanctions. Further, although intentional
acts, such as sexual or physical assaults on staff, are egregious and
highly undesirable, it is questionable whether health care facilities
have sufficient control over third parties to prevent such acts. Finally,
a truly confidential, non-punitive reporting system may not be politi-
cally feasible if the system shields criminal acts or other intentional
harm from disclosure.
Several categories advanced by the NQF also appear to require
further investigation before determining whether an error occurred.
For example, not every intraoperative or post-operative death of an
otherwise healthy patient is due to error. Suicide of a patient in a
mental health facility on suicide watch is different than suicide of a
patient admitted to a general medical facility with no known suicidal
tendencies. The latter may be unpredictable, or as tort law would de-
scribe, unforeseeable. Similarly, patients leaving a medical facility
against the advice of their physicians are in a different category than
patients confined in a mental health facility or residing in a nursing
home who manage to elope.285
A final "drawback '2 86 to the NQF list is that widespread adoption
of the list may not move states significantly closer to the IOM's goal
of quantifying and reducing the incidence of all serious medical er-
rors. The NQF chose to target the most egregious system errors. By
doing so, the list captures only a subset of errors and does not identify
many judgment or skill related events such as wrong diagnoses, fail-
ure to use appropriate tests, avoidable delays in treatment, and surgi-
cal mishaps or other technical lapses. These events, as discussed pre-
viously, make up a large percentage of preventable errors identified in
the HMPS, UCMPS and other studies.287 Labeling these events as
errors also provokes the most controversy because the reviewer's as-
284 The VA's mandatory reporting system excludes intentionally unsafe acts
from events to be reported. See DEP'T OF VETERAN'S AFFAIRS, VETERAN'S HEALTH
ADMIN., VHA NATIONAL PATIENT SAFETY IMPROVEMENT HANDBOOK 6 (Jan. 30,
2002), available at http://www.patientsafety.gov/NCPShb.pdf
285 The NQF additionally specifies that the category of patient elopement
excludes "competent adults." SERIOus REPORTABLE EVENTS IN HEALTH CARE, supra
note 274, at 6. But mental illness and incompetency do not necessarily coexist and
determining who is competent and for what purpose is not always easy. There are
many different legal and medical definitions of competency. See Samantha Wey-
rauch, Decision Making for Incompetent Patients: Who Decides and By What Stan-
dards?, 35 TULSA L.J. 765 (2002).
286 Focusing on a finite list of events is a drawback only if one wants to con-
tinue the current system of trying to measure all adverse events, many of which do not
involve error.
287 See supra, note 56.
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sessment usually involves complex variables on which it is difficult to
obtain reliable data.288 Understanding these difficulties, the NFQ
wisely chose to formulate a limited number of objective, clearly de-
fined events for legislatures to use, at least as a starting point, in set-
ting policy for reporting adverse events.289 Not only will providers
have guidance in knowing what to report, but also by having a finite
number of events to investigate to determine if error occurred, the
financial burden on states will be significantly reduced. Although the
numbers reported under the NQF list will not mirror (or even ap-
proach) the IOM's estimates of error, they will reflect its goal of fo-
cusing on system, not individual, errors.
Ultimately, as the IOM recognized, better reporting will not im-
prove safety if nothing is done with the data.290 The value of report-
ing systems may not be in the number of reports, but rather in dis-
semination of the lessons learned from interpretation of the informa-
tion collected. Analysis of the cause of errors and feedback to health
care providers are crucial to any reporting system, whether mandatory
or voluntary. However, adequate funding and technical expertise are
needed to accomplish this task. Five years ago, President Clinton
stated that the federal government wanted to give states with manda-
tory reporting systems "the tools to do it right.' '291 To date, the federal
government has not responded to the IOM's recommendation that it
assist states financially with establishing and implementing their re-
porting systems.292 Without federal assistance, it is unlikely most
states will find the resources either to create or improve their pro-
grams.
B. Voluntary Reporting Systems
The data collected by Minnesota and Connecticut demonstrate
that states using the NQF list or similar criteria will capture a much
lower number of medical errors than projected by the 1OM.
Undoubtedly, many events labeled as errors by the IOM will not be
counted, but it is neither cost-effective nor practical to expect states to
assume the primary reponsibility in a national reporting scheme.
Private agencies and the federal government also have a role in
assessing and monitoring medical error.
288 See discussion supra Part I.B., C.
289 The NQF concedes that the list is a starting point for discussion. SERIOUS
REPORTABLE EVENTS IN HEALTHCARE, supra note 274, at v.
290 See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
291 President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President on Medical Errors,
supra note 14.
292 See ROSENTHAL & BOOTH, supra note 248, at 1.
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Although some analysts have suggested a national reporting
299
system, 293 the IOM recognized that a unitary, federal program was
probably not feasible from either a political or financial standpoint.294
Instead, the IOM encouraged the development of voluntary reporting
programs that collect evidence of near misses and less serious harms.
Analysis of these incidents can provide valuable insight into identify-
295ing systemic problems and recommending safer practices. How-
ever, there are far more near misses and events that cause minimal
harm than serious adverse events,296 and a national system would be
cost-prohibitive due to the large numbers of errors that would require
analysis and feedback to health care providers.297
Congress also appears poised to reject a program run by the
federal government in which health care providers report events
directly to a national system. Instead, proposed legislation requires
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a national
database that would be a repository of information reported to patient
safety organizations certified by the Secretary.298 Data would be
submitted in a common format to be determined by the Secretary.
299
Current programs or those under development that cover specific
health care sectors or specialties provide a reasonable alternative to a
national system.300  For example, the USP MedMARx program has
been successful in capturing medication errors and in providing feed-
back to providers. 30 1 There are several initiatives that are being un-
dertaken in the area of intensive care, which involve easy to use, web-
302thbased reporting. Under these focused systems, data can be stan-
293 E.g., Nat'l Patient Safety Found., Reporting as a Means To Improve Pa-
tient Safety: Roundtable Discussion (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.npsf.org/
download/patientsafetyroundtable.pdf. In early 2004, England established the first
national reporting system to tackle errors in the National Health System. It is ex-
pected to cost $1.9 million for the first eight years. Vittal Katikireddi, National Re-
porting System for Medical Errors is Launched, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 481 (2004).
294 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 105-06.
295 Id. at 8.
296 Leape, supra note 10, at 1636 (noting the annual numbers of errors could
be as many as 5,000,000).
297 Id. at 1636-37. In 1994, the aviation reporting system cost $70 per case to
investigate. Even if only ten percent of the possible five million errors were reported
each year, at $70 per case, the cost would approach $35 million. Id. That figure is
probably higher today. See Lucian L. Leape, Reporting of Medical Errors, Time for a
Reality Check, 9 QUAL. HEALTH CARE 144, 145 (2000) (estimate of $100 per case).
298 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, S. 544, 109th Cong.,
§ 923(a).
299 id. at § 923(b).
300 See Leape, supra note 10, at 1637.
301 Id. at 1635.
302 See, e.g., ICUSRS Intensive Care Unit Safety Reporting System, at
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dardized and accessible to analysts who can provide health care pro-
viders with specific advice on safer practices.
30 3
There is considerable overlap in reporting systems and, to avoid
duplication of effort, consideration should be given to a reduction in
the number of programs now in operation. If a patient in a VA
hospital experiences harm as a result of a medication error, there are
at least seven possible systems to which that error can be reported.
To reduce the burden on providers, the Department of Health and
Human Services is currently spearheading an effort to coordinate fed-
eral reporting systems. In April 2001, Secretary Thompson an-
nounced the formation of the Patient Safety Task Force composed of
representatives of AHRQ, CDC, FDA and CMS (Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services) to coordinate data collection and research
activities among federal agencies. 30 5 Goals of the coordinated net-
work include establishing a reporting system that avoids cumbersome
and inconsistent formats by utilizing uniform data standards, dissemi-
nating best safety practices, and protecting confidentiality of patients
and providers.30 6
The effectiveness of any reporting system depends in large part on
the commitment of professionals to implement safe practices. Any
system should be designed to be "safe, simple and worthwhile. 30 7 A
federally protected voluntary network for reporting that leads to the
examination of the causes of errors, rather than merely counting num-
bers or pointing blame, should ease health care provider's concerns
and burdens and encourage them to discuss errors openly, providing
an atmosphere for change.
http://www.icusrs.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (implementing anonymous report-
ing for ICUs); Gautham Suresh, et al., Voluntary Anonymous Reporting of Medical
Errors for Neonatal Intensive Care, 113 PEDIATRICS 1609 (2004) (finding anonymous
reporting in neonatal units captured significant number of errors).
303 For example, the USP's MER program regularly issues alerts and recom-
mendations for preventing medication errors. United States Pharmacopeia, Patient
Safety, USP Medication Tools, at http://www.usp.org/patientSafety (last visited May
5, 2005).
304 These include FDA, MER, MedMARx, JCAHO, the VA internal and
external reporting systems and any applicable state system.
305 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Patient Safety Task Force
Fact Sheet (July 2003), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/taskforce/psfactst.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2005).306 Id.
307 Leape, supra note 10, at 1635.
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C. Legislative Protection of Patient Safety Data
Although using common terms and easing the burden of reporting
will improve the quality of reports, the number of reports will not
increase until steps are taken to protect the confidentiality of reporters
and their communications. Some experts claim "all reporting is fun-
damentally voluntary. 3 °8 This statement is in recognition of the fact
that no system can force providers to report when it is inimical to their
own interests. To increase reporting, the focus should be on patient
safety and away from the "shame and blame" of the current health
care and legal systems.
30 9
First, whistleblower protection for reporters from adverse
employment actions is an important part of any legislation.
Confidential data acquired through the reporting system should be not
used for punishment. Removing names of involved professionals in
the reports would be the most protective of health care professionals,
although anonymous reporting may hinder follow-up investigation. 310
Non-punitive does not mean that the person who committed the
error will be free from any responsibility for harm to a patient. It
simply means that no action may be taken by an employer or reporting
agency against a person who reports an error, and that safety reports
will be kept confidential and not used for retribution. Mechanisms
exist outside reporting systems for holding professionals and facilities
accountable when they are negligent, incompetent, or dangerous.
Disciplinary actions, license revocations, individual lawsuits and
criminal penalties currently exist to deter and punish such acts.
Further, if some form of public accountability is a priority, it
should be directed not at the reporter, but at facilities or health care
systems that fail to institute safe practices based on the lessons learned
from reporting events. 311 To fulfill their duty to the public, state regu-
308 IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 98 (citing Charles Billings).
309 By 2004, the IOM appeared to question its previous recommendation for
public disclosure of serious errors. PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 45, at 308 ("The
Committee also believes that further study is needed to define the appropriate condi-
tions for disclosure and protection of data from patient safety reports in all systems.").
310 See MARCHEV, supra note 156, at 4, n.8.
311 If part of the reasoning for the disclosure of information is so the public
can make informed decisions as to the choice of a health care facility, a different type
of reporting, which involves performance measures of the quality of care actually
provided, may hold more promise than the collection of errors. The National Volun-
tary Hospital Reporting Initiative is an effort of the American Hospital Association,
the Federation of American Hospitals and the Association of American Medical Col-
leges to provide information about hospital quality to the public. See NATIONAL
VOLUNTARY HOSPITAL REPORTING INITIATIVE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES FACT SHEET (Feb. 18, 2004), available at
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latory agencies must be able to follow up on reports to ensure that
action has been taken to prevent, or at least minimize, the possibility
of reoccurrence of a similar event. With a short, definable list, these
agencies are in a better position to ensure the public that remedial
efforts will be made by the reporting facility. Connecticut, for
example, requires hospitals and outpatient surgical facilities to file a
corrective action plan within thirty days after the adverse event
occurred.3 12 Failure to implement a corrective plan may result in
disciplinary action by the Department of Public Health.313 All reports
are confidential, however, and the organization is not punished for
making or reporting an error.3 14 Minnesota has also embraced a non-
punitive approach to mandatory reporting. Its statute emphasizes that
the purpose of reporting is not to punish errors by professionals or
facility employees but to ensure that hospitals develop plans to
improve the health care system.315
Although various measures can and have been taken by states to
address professionals' concerns about exposure to liability and retalia-
tion for reporting errors, what is needed is guaranteed federal protec-
tion of the data gathered by state, federal and private health care
safety systems. Federal legislation to safeguard the confidentially of
data is a critical part of improving patient safety, but as yet is unreal-
ized. Action by Congress is needed to assure professionals in all
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/quality/hospital/NVHRIFactSheet.pdf. CMS and other
agencies have joined these organizations to collect reports from hospitals that volun-
tarily agree to provide data concerning their compliance with selected safety meas-
ures. Initially, ten measures representing generally agreed upon standards of care
were chosen for three serious medical conditions in the Medicare population. Hospi-
tals that agree to participate in the project report performance information demonstrat-
ing compliance with the quality measures. For example, one of the illnesses is Acute
Myocardial Infarction (heart attack). The measures include (1) aspirin prescribed at
arrival; (2) aspirin prescribed at discharge; (3) beta-blocker prescribed at arrival; (4)
beta-blocker prescribed at discharge; and (5) ace-inhibitor prescribed for left ventricu-
lar systolic dysfunction. THE CENTER FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES,
NATIONAL VOLUNTARY HOSPITAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, TEN MEASURE STARTER SET,
QUALITY HOSPITAL INITIATIVE, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/quality/hospital/
ListoflOMeasures.pdf. The public can access online the reports for those hospitals
that volunteer to participate in the program. Only compliance rates are reported;
patients and individual practioners are not identified. See United States Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Hospital Compare, at http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov/
(last visited May 5, 2005).
312 CONN. STAT. ANN. § 19A-127n (b) (West, WESTLAW through Feb. Reg.
Session and May 11 Sp. Session).
313 id.
314 id.
315 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.7067(a) (West Supp. 2004).
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states that they can freely discuss and report mistakes that occur in
hospitals, nursing homes, and ambulatory surgery centers.
Pending legislation provides that protection. In 2004, the Senate
and House overwhelmingly passed similar legislation to protect re-
porters and patient safety data.316 The bills died in conference, but the
Senate reintroduced its version earlier this year. The Senate bill pro-
vides that a health care facility may not take an adverse employment
action against a person who, in good faith, reports adverse events or
errors to a provider or patient safety center.317 The legislation also
contains broad federal protection from subpoena or discovery of data
collected by patient safety organizations.318 The Senate bill differs
somewhat from the 2004 House bill in the scope of the privilege as
well as in the data to be protected. The House bill shielded safety
reports from subpoena or discovery in civil and administrative pro-
ceedings, while the Senate version also protects data in criminal
cases. 3 19 Legislation passed by the House afforded a privilege for
"patient safety work product," which is more narrowly defined than
the Senate bill's "patient safety data., 320 Notwithstanding these dif-
ferences, the legislation has received wide support in Congress and
after five years of effort, deserves prompt reconciliation and pas-
sage.321
V. CONCLUSION
It has been more than five years since the IOM warned that medi-
cal errors were causing the death of a shocking number of patients in
American hospitals. The findings were a wake-up call for the health
316 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2004, H.R. 663, 108th
Cong. § 922(g) (2004) (Senate version), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.; Patient
Safety and Quality Improvement Act, H.R. 663, 108th Cong. § 922(b) (2004) (House
version). The Senate version of H.R. 663 passed the Senate by unanimous consent
and the House version passed 418-6. BILL SUMMARY AND STATUS FOR THE 108TH
CONGRESS: H.R. 663, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d108:1 :./temp/
-bdYPY9:@@@D&summ2=m&Ilbss/dlO8query.html (last visited May 15, 2005).
317 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, S. 544, 109th Cong.
§ 922(g) (2005).
311 Id. § 922 (a).
319 Compare former H.R. 663 § 922 (a)(1),(2) (House version), with S. 544, §
921(a)(1)(2).
320 Compare former H.R. 663 § 921(5) (House version), with S. 544, § 921(a).
321 Although beyond the scope of this article, alternatives to the current
liability system also deserve continued study by politicians and health care policy
analysts. Lawsuits do little to deter mistakes, but cause valuable information about
medical errors to be suppressed because of fear of liability. See Michelle M. Mello &
Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Mal-
practice Reform, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1595 (2002).
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care industry, the public, and the government. Although the IOM
brought a welcome focus to the problem of patient safety in our health
care institutions, it is debatable whether any real improvement has
been made. Reducing medical error by a precise figure is a goal that
cannot easily be attained because many errors cannot be measured
with any degree of accuracy.322 Many decisions made by profession-
als reflect the uncertainty inherent in medicine, and it is unlikely we
will ever know the precise rate of error in health care settings because
we rely on humans to be able to identify errors and to distinguish
them from complications of appropriate treatment or the natural
course of a patient's illness.
As currently implemented, most reporting systems are not able to
identify medical error or monitor progress in the prevention of error.
The full magnitude of the problem is still unknown and no one knows
how many errors exist that are not being reported or whether reporting
has had any positive impact on patient safety. The fundamental objec-
tive of any reporting system is to encourage discussion of both tragic
and minor errors, so that health care professionals and organizations
can learn from their mistakes. The lack of a uniform taxonomy of
medical error and the failure to provide comprehensive legal protec-
tion of patient safety data remain as substantial impediments to the
goal of preventing future errors in the health care system.
Ultimately, it may be unproductive to place trust in numbers that
are so hard to achieve or to engage in debates about whether an event
is an error or a bad outcome of appropriate care. Quality and safety in
health care cannot be judged by statistics alone and because of its
unique complexity, we cannot expect an error-free health care sys-
tem.323 Dollars now spent chasing elusive numbers may better be
used to fund safety practices that are known to reduce harm to pa-
tients. For example, it is widely appreciated that adverse drug events
continue to be a prevalent source of harm to patients. The FDA has
recently implemented regulations mandating bar codes on all prescrip-
tion drugs in an effort to reduce medication errors.324 Requiring even
322 If states use exclusively the NQF list, a finite reduction in a limited num-
ber of errors may be achievable. However, the NQF list omits, by definition, a large
number of preventable adverse events labeled errors by the IOM. See note 287 and
accompanying text.
323 Leape suggests that even if there were a ten-fold reduction in errors,
achieving a 99.9% error-free system, it would still equate to two dangerous landings
per day at O'Hare International Airport. Leape, supra note 4, at 1851 (citing W.E.
Deming).
324 Bar Code Label Requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 201.25 (2004). This type of
safety measure is not inexpensive, however, and financial resources vary among
hospitals expected to implement the regulations. See Markian Hawryluk, FDA Tar-
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simple measures such as hand washing with alcohol-based rubs will
significantly reduce hospital-acquired infections.325 Reporting sys-
tems designed to identify and measure rates of error should be seen as
helpful tools and not as ends in and of themselves. Trying to achieve
a specific, quantitative reduction may be less important than simply
applying the lessons already learned to ensure the safety of patients in
our health care system.
gets Medication Errors by Requiring Bar Codes on Drugs, AM. MED. NEWS (Mar. 15,
2004), at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/03/15/gvl 10315.htm.
325 See Center for Disease Control, Guideline for Hand Hygiene in Health-
Care Settings Recommendations of the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advi-
sory Committee and the HICPAC/SHEA/APIC/IDSA Hand Hygiene Task Force,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/handhygiene.
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